12.24
putut joko utomo
An influent ial new movement has emerged in p hilos op hy in t he p as t t hirt y years which has come t o b e known as Pos t modernis m. Some b elieve t hat t he t erm "Pos t modernis m" is amb iguous and hard t o define, and it is t rue t hat it is oft en us ed in a numb er of ways which b ear lit t le relat ion t o t he p os t modernis t movement in p hilos op hy. For t he p os t modernis t ap p roach t o knowledge is als o dominant in a variet y of dis cip lines , es p ecially lit erat ure, his t ory, t heology, feminis m, and mult icult uralis m (t hough I do not wish to suggest that everyt hing in thes e dis cip lines is defined b y p os t modernis m). Before I b egin my dis cus s ion and crit iq ue of p os t modernis m, I wis h t o p res ent my own unders t anding of t he t erm, a working definit ion which cap t ures it s p h i l o s o p h i ca l imp ort . I define p os t modernis m as a movement whos e cent ral t heme is t he crit iq ue of ob ject ive rat ionalit y and ident it y, and a working out of t he imp licat ions of t his crit iq ue for cent ral q ues t ions in p hilos op hy, lit erat ure and cult ure. My definit ion is mot ivat ed b y my b elief t hat p os t modernis m is mainly a p hilos op hical t heory ab out t he nat ure of knowledge, and the ability of t he human mind t o know realit y. In s hort , p os t modernis m mainly revolves around a s et of met a p h ys i ca l cl a i ms ab out t he nat ures of language and meaning. J eanFrançois Lyot ard des crib es t he p os t modern condit ion as charact erized b y an "incredulit y t oward met anarrat ives ," and t his is as good a definit ion as we get from wit hin the ranks of post modernis m, as long as it is unders t ood t o mean an incredulit y t oward a l l met anarrat ives . (O f cours e Lyot ard will officially deny t hat p os t modernis m is a met ap hys ical t hes is .) In t his art icle, I will at t emp t t o develop a s et of crit ical reflect ions on t he p h i l o s o p h i ca l b a s i s of p os t modernis m, and p os t modernis t t hinking generally.
I b elieve t hat a careful ex aminat ion of t he p hilos op hical b as is of p os t modernis m is t he mos t imp ort ant q ues t ion a s erious t hinker can rais e ab out p os t modernis m; if t his q ues t ion is ignored, or t reat ed s up erficially, then t he ap p licat ion of p os t modernis t ideas t o p hilos op hical is s ues and t ex t s , t o q ues t ions and is s ues in ot her dis cip lines , and t o s ocial, p olit ical and educat ional agendas will b e great ly undermined. (All college cours es which are dealing wit h p os t modernis m s hould dis cus s t his q ues t ion.) My article will b e an at t emp t t o develop a s et of crit ical reflect ions on t he p hilos op hical foundat ions of p os t modernis m focus ing, in p art icular, on t he work of t he French p hilos op her, J acq ues Derrida. Derrida's p hilos op hy is oft en described as "decons t ruct ion," and I cons ider his p hilos op hy an ideal rep res ent at ive of
p os t modernis t p hilos op hy in general. I will, t herefore, us e t he t erms "decons t ruct ion" and "p os t modernis m" s ynonymous ly for t he p urposes of this art icle. I will illus t rat e t hat Derrida's claim t hat textsespecially philosophical t ex t s need t o b e decons t ruct ed, according t o t he met hod he p roposes, is easily s hown t o b e fraught wit h s erious difficult ies . T hes e difficult ies will b e illus t rat ed p art ly b y means of an analys is of Derrida's decons t ruct ionis t reading of Plat o. I will t hen p res ent and develop five crit icis ms of p os t modernis m: firs t , t hat it confus es aes t het ics with metaphysics; second, that it mis t akes a s s er t i o n for a r g u men t in p hilos op hy; t hird, t hat it is guilt y of r el a t i vi s m; fourt h, t hat it is s el f co n t r a d i ct o r y ; and, fift h, t hat it is guilt y of int ellect ual arrogance b ecaus e it s p rop onent s s eem t o ins is t t hat it s crit iq ue of t radit ional p hilos op hy can s t ill s ucceed even t hough it s positive claims have not been es t ab lis hed.
I. T HE POSIT IVE CLAIMS OF POSTMO DE R NISM
2 T he main t hes is of Derrida's p os it ion, as I unders t and it , can be stated in t he following way. Wes t ern p hilos op hers have b een mis t aken in their belief t hat b eing is p r es en ce , and t he key t o unders t anding p res ence is s omet hing along t he lines of s ub s t ance, s amenes s , ident it y, es s ence, clear and dis t inct ideas , et c. For, according t o Derrida, a l l i d en t i t i es , p r es en ces , p r ed i ca t i o n s , et c., d ep en d f o r t h ei r exi s t en ce o n s o met h i n g o u t s i d e t h ems el ves , something wh i ch i s a b s en t a n d d i f f er en t f r o m t h ems el ves . O r again: all identities involve t heir d i f f er en ces and r el a t i o n s ; t hes e differences and relat ions are as p ect s or feat ures out s ide of the ob ject different from it , yet relat ed t o it yet t hey a r e n ever f u l l y p r es en t . O r again: realit y it s elf is a kind of "free p lay" of d i f f ér a n ce (a new t erm coined b y Derrida); no ident it ies really ex is t (in t he t radit ional s ens e) at t his level; ident it ies are s imp ly cons t ructs of the mind, and es s ent ially of language.
3 In order t o elab orat e t hes e p oint s furt her, it is help ful t o distinguish in Derrida's work b et ween t wo realms , t he realm of realit y (or of différance), and t he realm of ident it ies (or of p redicat ion and p res ence). Derrida b elieves t hat t here are no ident it ies , no s elfcont ained p res ences , no fix ed, s et t led meanings at the level of d i f f ér a n ce . Furt her, t he realm of d i f f ér a n ce is n o n co g n i t i ve ; i.e., it cannot b e fully cap t ured or des crib ed b y means of any set of concepts, or logical s ys t em which makes ob ject s "p res ent " t o t he mind. Derrida makes this p oint well in Ma r g i n s o f Ph i l o s o p h y : "It is t he dominat ion of b eings t hat d i f f ér a n ce everywhere comes t o s olicit . . . t o s hake . . . it is t he det erminat ion of b eing as p res ence t hat is int errogat ed b y t he t hought of d i f f ér a n ce . Di f f ér a n ce is not . It is not a p res ent b eing. It governs not hing, reigns over not hing, and nowhere ex ercis es any aut horit y . . . T here is no es s ence of d i f f ér a n ce ."
Yet , according t o Derrida, alt hough t he realm of d i f f ér a n ce is non
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4 cognit ive, it never occurs wi t h o u t cognit ive knowledge (the realm of presence). T his is b ecaus e our cont act wit h it in human ex p erience, our involvement with it t hrough language, always t akes p lace b y means of concep t s , or p redication. And t his is s imp ly t o s ay t hat all knowledge is co n t ext u a l in t he s ense that the relat ions of an ob ject in any s ys t em of ob ject s or meanings are always changing (differing), and hence meaning (i.e., ident it y) is cont inually b eing p os t p oned (i.e., deferred). T he realm of d i f f ér a n ce is ap p rop riat ely conveyed or ex p res s ed in p hilos op hical works b y means of met ap hor b ecaus e it is t he nat ure of met ap hor t o s ignify wit hout s ignifying, and t his illus t rat es nicely Derrida's point that an ident it y is what it is not and is not what it is . Derrida s killfully emp loys many different and oft en s t riking met ap hors t o make t his s ame point rep eat edly: margins , t race, flow, archiwrit ing, t ain of t he mirror, alt erit y, s up p lement , et c. We mus t now cons ider what all of t his means for the t as k of evaluat ing p art icular worldviews , and for t he p ract ice of t ex t ual analys is .
T o relat e all of t his t o t he is s ue of worldviews (es p ecially t he worldview of t radit ional p hilos op hy), and t o ex p res s t hes e p oint s in more down t o eart h language, what t he p os t modernis t s are s aying is t hat no p art icular worldview can claim t o have t he t rut h. All worldviews can be called int o q ues t ion (including t he worldview of decons t ruct ion it s elf, a p oint t o which I will ret urn lat er). T he reas on all worldviews can b e called int o q ues t ion is b ecaus e t he meanings which are cons t it ut ive of a worldview cannot b e known t o b e t rue ob ject ively. T his is b ecaus e t here is no ob ject ive knowledge. All knowledge is co n t ext u a l and is influenced b y cult ure, t radit ion, language, p rejudices , b ackground b eliefs , et c., and is t herefore, in s ome very imp ort ant s ens e, r el a t i ve t o t hes e p henomena. T he influence of t hes e p henomena on t rut h or meaning is not t rivial or b enign; it is s uch t hat it inevit ab ly undermines all claims t o ob ject ivit y t hat one might b e t emp t ed t o make from t he p oint of view of one's worldview. So t he job of decons t ruct ion is t o challenge and call int o q ues t ion all claims t o ob ject ive knowledge b y illus t rat ing alt ernat ive meanings and "t rut hs " in any p art icular worldview, which are really t here whet her t he adherent s of t he worldview recognize t hem or not . And t hes e alt ernat ive meanings will undermine t he worldview in q ues t ion, b ecaus e t hey will b e different from, and oft en op p os ed t o, t he original, "ob ject ive" meanings claimed for that worldview.
Decons t ruct ion, t herefore, q uickly lends it s elf t o a p olit ical agenda in t he s ens e t hat worldviews are almos t b y definit ion op p res s ive s ince t hey p rivilege s ome (lit eral) meanings and marginalize ot hers ; decons t ruct ion t hus b ecomes the met hod for reject ing and deb unking worldviews . Convers ely, it als o allows t hos e views and readings and alt ernat ive meanings which have us ually b elonged t o minorit y group s , and which have oft en b een marginalized, t o reclaim t heir right ful p lace in t he market p lace of ideas . Not e, however, that t hey do not reclaim t heir p lace b ecaus e t hey are t rue (for t hat would b e t o acknowledge ob ject ive knowledge), b ut b ecaus e, s ince t here is no ob ject ive
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knowledge, t hey have jus t as much claim t o legit imacy as any ot her view. O f cours e, t hey t oo will have t o b e decons t ruct ed in t he end. (This is a point many s up p ort ers of t he decons t ruct ionis t ap p roach convenient ly overlook; t hey freq uent ly t alk as if t he marginal views are s omehow t r u e , and the mainstream views somehow f a l s e .) 5 In t he language of t ex t ual analys is , Derrida is p rop os ing that there are no f i xed mea n i n g s p res ent in t he t ex t , des p it e any ap p earance t o t he cont rary. Rat her, t he ap p arent ident it ies (i.e., lit eral meanings ) p res ent in a t ex t als o dep end for t heir ex is t ence on s omet hing out s ide t hems elves , s omet hing which is abs ent and different from t hems elves (i.e., t hey dep end on t he op erat ion of d i f f ér a n ce ). As a res ult , t he meanings in a t ex t cons t ant ly shift both in relation t o t he s ub ject who works wit h t he t ex t , and in relat ion t o t he cultural and social world in which t he t ex t is immers ed. In t his way, t he lit eral readings of t ex t s , along wit h t he int ent ions of t he aut hor, are called int o q ues t ion b y Derrida's view of ident it y. His p os it ion p rivileges writ ing as op p os ed t o s p eech and t hought , for writ ing has a cert ain indep endence from aut hor and reader which gives a p riorit y t o amb iguit y, nonlit eralit y, and which frus t rates the intentions of t he aut hor. As t he French writ er, Roland Bart hes , s ugges t s , our concern mus t be to look at h o w t ex t s mean, not at wh a t t hey mean. 6 Derrida's t hes is , however, is not res t rict ed to b ooks or art works , for tex t s may cons is t of any s et of everchanging meanings . Hence, t he world, and almos t any ob ject or comb inat ion of ob ject s in it , may b e regarded as a "t ex t ." Pos t modernis t p hilos op hy is t herefore very radical indeed. Walt Anders on p ut s t his very ap t ly when he s ays t hat "Decons t ruct ion goes well b eyond [s aying] right you areifyout hinkyouare; it s mes s age is clos er t o wrong you are what ever you t hink, unles s you t hink you may b e wrong, in which cas e you may be rightbut you don't really mean what you think you do anyway."
7 Now b efore we p roceed t o elab orat e furt her jus t what Derrida's view of ident it y ent ails , it is wort h not ing t hat p os t modernis t t hinkers in whos e numb er I would include Roland Bart hes and Michel Foucault , in addit ion to Lyot ard and Derridahave somet imes tried to avoid the change that t hey are offering a p hilos op hical t h eo r y ab out language and realit y, and have tried to ins is t t hat t hey are s imp ly p rop os ing a new met h o d for reading t ex t s . In short, t hey would deny t hat t hey are making s ub s t ant ive or met ap hys ical claims . In fact , s ome p hilos op hers b elieve t hat Derrida s hould not b e read as making any s ub s t ant ive claims at all. This is a view advocat ed by Richard Rort y.
8 Rort y ident ifies t wo different ways in which Derrida has b een read by his American admirers . O n one s ide are t hos e who read him as a "t rans cendent al" p hilos op her, i.e., as a p hilos op her who gives us "rigorous argument s for s urp ris ing p hilos op hical conclus ions ." A t rans cendent al p hilos op her, t herefore, is a p hilos op her who is making s ub s t ant ive claims which are eit her t rue or fals e, and for which he offers argument s (and which, if t rue, could p os s ib ly mot ivat e s ocial and p olit ical agendas ). T his is ob vious ly t he way in which I am reading Derrida. O n t he ot her s ide, according t o Rort y,
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9 are t hos e who s ee him as "having invent ed a new, s p lendidly ironic way of writ ing ab out t he p hilos op hical t radit ion" which "emp has izes t he p layful, dis t ancing, ob liq ue way in which Derrida handles t radit ional p hilos op hical figures and t op ics ," and which is not concerned wit h t he s ub s t ance of his views . T hat is t o s ay, Derrida can eit her b e read in t he firs t way as a p hilos op her who is making s ub s t ant ive claims ab out language and reality, or in t he s econd way as a kind of dilet t ant e who ex p eriment s wit h t ex t s . Rort y p refers t o read Derrida in t he s econd way. As a p hilos op her, however, I see lit t le value in reading Derrida in t he s econd way. Surely t he mos t res p ons ib le op t ion is t o read him in t he firs t way, es p ecially s ince t his is how he is mos t oft en read? Indeed, t his is the way in which he mu s t b e read if his work is t o p rovide p hilos op hical s up p ort for s ocial and p olit ical conclus ions . In s hort , I b elieve t hat Derrida has t o b e taken at his word and read as a tra ns cendent al p hilos op her. But it is imp ort ant t o not e t hat if a t hinker in any dis cip line op t s t o read Derrida in t he s econd way, t hen he or s he cannot us e his ideas t o advocat e educat ional, p olit ical or s ocial agendas ; if however, one does wish to emp loy his ideas in s up p ort of various agendas , t hen one is ob liged t o p rovide a p hilos op hical jus t ificat ion for t hes e ideas . For ex amp le, if an Englis h p rofes s or wis hes t o decons t ruct t he t ex t s of J ane Aus t en and read into them an analys is of t he op p res s ion of women in t he ninet eent h cent ury, t hen t hat p rofes s or would have t o b eg i n t his t as k wit h a p h i l o s o p h i ca l j u s t i f i ca t i o n of decons t ruct ion. Let me move on to elab orat e and illus t rat e the point s I have b een making by turning to Derrida's reading of Plat o. II. DE R R IDA'S RE ADING OF PLAT O
10 Now reading Derrida as a t rans cendent al p hilosopher, he holds that all of t he leading figures of Wes t ern "logocent ricis m" have b een s educed by the not ion of b eing as p res ence. However, t hes e p hilos op hers fail t o ap p reciat e t he realit y of d i f f ér a n ce which is really t here, and wh i ch i s o p er a t i ve i n t h ei r wo r k wh et h er t h ey a ckn o wl ed g e i t o r n o t . What we mus t now do, Derrida b elieves , is at t emp t t o s how how t heir t ex t s , which at t emp t t o ex p lain t he nat ure of realit y in t erms of b eing as p res ence, act ually cont inually presuppose ab s ence, d i f f ér a n ce , relat ions , et c., at every t urn. T hat is , we mus t "decons t ruct " their tex t s .
I want now t o illus t rat e how this is supp os ed to work in a p art icular cas e; I wis h t o cons ider what a decons t ruct ionis t reading of a t ex t act ually looks like. Here I will t urn t o an ex aminat ion of one of Derrida's own readings : t he es s ay on Plat o in his b ook Di s s emi n a t i o n called "Plat o's Pharmacy." Now Plat o is p erhap s t he "logocent ric" p hilos op her p a r excel l en ce of the Wes t ern tradit ion; he carries a s p ecial guilt becaus e he had s uch a p rofound influence on t he his t ory of p hilos op hy. Plat o, of cours e, it goes almos t wit hout s aying, was at t emp t ing t o p res ent in his work a s et of met ap hys ical views ab out t he nat ure of realit y. His main t hemes are very well
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known, and I will not b ot her t o rep eat t hem here. But Plat o is firmly within the met ap hys ics of p res ence, and argues at lengt h for a whole met ap hys ics of ex t ralinguis t ic t rut hs of t he t yp e t hat , officially, Derrida wis hes t o decons t ruct . In his es s ay, Derrida focus es in p art icular on Plat o's dialogue, Ph a ed r u s , b ecaus e at t he end of t he Ph a ed r u s Plat o ex p licit ly crit icizes writ ing, and argues that it is inferior t o p ure t hought and dis cus s ion, and t hat reading and rhet oric are inferior t o reas oning and dialect ic. T he Ph a ed r u s ap p ears to b e a q uit e app rop riat e t ex t for Derrida t o choos e, b ecaus e, as well as dealing wit h s ome of Plat o's main ideas , it als o cont ains an explicit criticism of writ ing, and argues for it s inferiorit y t o s p eech and t hought . So t his t ex t might b e q uit e fert ile ground for Derrida. Yet , as one ex amines carefully Derrida's clos e reading of, and comment ary on, Plat o's t ex t , his ap p roach has t hree feat ures which it is imp ort ant t o ident ify. Firs t , a s ignificant numb er of s t at ement s in Derrida's 1 0 0 + p age es s ay s imp ly make t he p oint that Plato does p rivilege lit eral readings (which Derrida ident ifies with speech) over nonliteral readings (which Derrida ident ifies wit h writ ing). In doing t his , Derrida's reading is q uit e mis leading, in t hat he makes s o ob vious a p oint in s uch a lab orious and ceremonial way. T hus , much of t he es s ay is given over t o es t ab lis hing what noone wis hes t o deny, i.e., t hat Plat o is wit hin t he met ap hys ics of pres ence.
Second, Derrida cont inually makes t he p oint that Plato (and indeed his t rans lat ors and comment at ors ) ignores t he fact t hat d i f f ér a n ce is t he way t hings really are, which means t hat t here are always amb iguit ies in his t ex t s which Plat o pas s es over in favor of what we will call "t he lit eral meaning" of language and t hought . However, t his is a p oint which Derrida s imp ly a s s er t s over and over again; nowhere does he p rovide any reas ons or arguments aimed at convincing us t hat we s hould accep t t his view. (I will illus t rat e this point lat er in t he art icle.) T hird, int erwoven t hroughout t he rep eat ed making of t his claim are concret e s ugges t ions and illus t rat ions b y Derrida of how Plat o's text mi g h t b e read in ways ot her t han t he lit eral one. Now let me b riefly t urn to the t wo main ex amp les Derrida emp loys t o decons t ruct Plat o's t ex t , ex amp les he us es to illus t rat e the op erat ion of d i f f ér a n ce in Plat o's tex t . Thes e ex amp les will allow me to illus t rat e furt her thes e three point s .
O ne of t he words Derrida s p ends a lot of t ime wit h is t he G reek word p h a r ma ko n which can mean eit her "cure" or "p ois on." Derrida p oints out that s ince t his word is init ially amb iguous , it b ecomes neces s ary t o s p ecify a p art icular meaning, or ident it y, for it b as ed on t he cont ex t in which we find it . For ex amp le, in t he Ph a ed r u s t he s t ory is t old of how t he god T heut h t ried t o s ell his wares t o King T hamus of Egyp t . Now one of T heut h's wares is writ ing, which he p romot es as a cure agains t memory los s , and as a significant aid in t he q ues t for knowledge. T he king, however, is not imp res s ed, and crit icizes writ ing. He is ex p res s ing Plat o's view when he s ays t hat writing will have a det riment al effect on memory, and will cut s t udent s off from t heir
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11 t eachers , and s o from t rut h. Derrida's p oint ap p ears t o be that both Theuth and t he King s ee writ ing as a p h a r ma ko n , b ut T heut h means b y t his t hat it is a cure, whereas t he king (and Plat o) regards it as a p ois on. Derrida as s ert s t hat unt il Plat o imp os es an int erp ret at ion here, t he meaning is amb iguous. Derrida want s us t o agree t hat , in realit y, if we might p ut it like t hat , amb iguit y is p rimary, and ident it y is s econdary, imp os ed, op p res s ive, and is exclusionary of ot her p os s ib ilit ies . T he amb iguit y, according t o Derrida, always as s ert s it s elf when a new reader engages wit h the tex t ; and, in Plat o's cas e, it as s ert s it s elf when a t rans lat or is confront ed b y words like p h a r ma ko n . So, according to Derrida, Plat o "decides in favor of a logic t hat does not t olerat e s uch p as s ages b et ween op p os ing s ens es of t he s ame word. . . ." Plat o, in s hort , could have emb raced t he free p lay of meanings and op p os it ions p res ent in his tex t (i.e., d i f f ér a n ce ); ins t ead, he t ried t o s up p res s t hes e op p os it ions , alt ernat ive int erp ret at ions , amb iguit ies , p uns , met ap hors , et c., in favor of a "lit eral" meaning. T his was his mis t ake, and t his is why he needs t o b e decons t ruct ed. Let me t ake a s econd ex amp le from t his es s ay. Here we t urn t o t he word p h a r ma ko s , which refers t o a "s cap egoat " in G reek religion. T his is an ex cellent ex amp le wit h which t o illus t rat e Derrida's met hod of deconstruction, and it will als o allow us lat er on t o ident ify a p rob lem wit h t he ap p licat ion of t he met hod. Alt hough t he word p h a r ma ko s does not act ually appear in Plato's t ex t , Derrida b elieves t hat t his not ion of t he s cap egoat is s u g g es ted by the text b ecaus e of it s clos e as s ociat ion wit h t he word p h a r ma ko n , and b ecaus e t here are a numb er of p os s ib le meanings linked t o t he concep t of s cap egoat in Plat o's tex t .
12 Derrida reveals s ome of t hes e ot her p os s ib le meanings ; for ex amp le, t he s cap egoat s ugges t s b eing ins ide t he cit y, and b eing outside too, because the G reeks us ed t o s acrifice t he s cap egoat and ex p el it from t he cit y in a p urifying ceremony. It could b e s een as b ot h a remedy for t he cit y's wellb eing, and a kind of p ois on t oo which had t o b e ex p elled. T he not ion of p h a r ma ko s , t he s cap egoat , is als o clos ely connect ed wit h Socrat es , as Yoav Rinon has ins ight fully p oint ed out . Firs t , Socrat es was b orn on t he day of t he s cap egoat 's ex p uls ion; s econd, he hims elf was a kind of s capegoat, essential to t he cit y, yet ex ecut ed. He was both cit izen and out s ider; his pers onalit y was als o a realizat ion of t he unit y of cont radict ions : he was honored and des p is ed, loved and hat ed, clos e and at a dis t ance, knowing all and knowing not hing, alive and dead, a remedy and a p ois on.
13 Again, Derrida's p oint is t hat all of t hes e links are possible readings of Plat o's t ex t , readings which Plat o did not int end, b ut which are really there; "all t hes e s ignificat ions ap p ear nonet heles s ," 14 as Derrida p ut s it . It is int eres t ing t o not e t hat while Derrida want s t o conclude from t his decons t ruct ion t hat t here does not ex is t "a Plat onic t ex t , clos ed up on it s elf, comp let e wit h it s ins ide and out s ide" ; nevert heles s he want s t o s ugges t t hat all t hes e p os s ib le readings are s u g g es t ed b y t h e t ext i t s el f , and b ecaus e of this they are somehow l eg i t i ma t e readings . By claiming t hat t hes e meanings are l inked to Plato's text
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in a way which can b e illus t rat ed in t he p roces s of decons t ruct ion, Derrida wis hes to p lace a l i mi t on how far one can go wit h a decons t ruct ion of a t ex t . In p art icular, he want s t o avoid s aying t hat one can jus t make up meanings that have no connect ion wit h t he t ex t at all. Pres umab ly, readings , int erp ret ations, and meanings n o t su g g es t ed by t h e text it s el f would be unaccep t ab le. III. FIVE CR IT IC AL PR OB LE MS FAC ING DE C ON ST R UC T ION
1 ) Deco n s t r u ct i o n con f u s es aes t h et i cs wi t h met a p h ys i cs : T he firs t crit ical p oint t o not e is t hat a decons t ruct ionis t reading is not , at leas t as Derrida p ract ices it , a reading where a n y t yp e of reading is p ermissible. Yet, it does involve "s haking t ex t s " t o make t hem s hudder and reveal alt ernat ive meanings t o t he lit eral meaning, and it is eas y t o s ee how t his ap p roach might s anct ion a n y t yp e of reading. For it is very difficult t o s ee how one could place a cont rol on t he met hod of decons t ruct ion t o rule out any s ugges t ed "link" to a t ex t . What is t o p revent a reader from p roducing any meaning t hey wis h from a t ex t ? What is t o p revent a reader, for ex amp le, from concluding t hat t he word p h a r ma ko s (t he s cap egoat ) s ugges t s t hat Plat o hims elf is a s cap egoat , s ay Aris t ot le's s cap egoat ? T he difficult y lies in t he fact t hat it will b e p rob lemat ic for Derrida to dict at e t hat a p art icular meaning is not legit imat e, for how can he judge t he ex p eriences , b ackground b eliefs , and int eres t s of t he reader who p roduces t he reading? I will ret urn t o t his p oint in a moment . Second, Derrida wis hes t o ident ify alt ernat ive readings in "Plat o's Pharmacy" in order t o illus t rat e t hat ot her readings a r e p o s s i b l e . Yet it s eems t o me t hat one can grant t his p oint , and s t ill hold t hat it f a i l s t o es t ab lis h Derrida's main claim. His main claim, as we have s een, is t hat t he lit eral meaning of a t ex t is not the legit imat e one.
It s eems t hat b y s imp ly s h o wi n g how a t ex t co u l d b e read in different ways t o t he way t he aut hor int ended, one does not demons t rat e t hat t he lit eral meaning is n o t t he main meaning, nor, more generally, t hat meaning mus t b e f o r ever def er r ed , or that all t ex t s need t o b e decons t ruct ed. In s hort , t he fact t hat we can force alt ernat ive meanings out of t ex t s like Plat o's Ph a ed r u s may have a es t h et i c s ignificance (and it may not ), b ut it does not s eem t o follow from t his t hat it als o has met a p h ys i ca l s ignificance. Derrida is s imp ly confus ing a p os s ib le (and undoub t edly cont rovers ial) ap p roach t o t he aes t het ics of a t ex t (or s et of meanings ) wit h t he met ap hys ical imp licat ions of t he tex t .
T o p ut t his key p oint in a s light ly different way: Derrida appears to be guilt y of making t he logically fallacious move from t he p remis e that the reader ca n (aft er much invent ivenes s and p ains t aking analys is ) read t ex t s in ways ot her t han t he lit eral one, t o t he conclus ion t hat t his is how t he reader o u g ht to read t ex t s , or, more generally, t o t he conclus ion t hat t here are no lit eral meanings , or t hat t here is no t rut h p res ent in a t ex t . T he firs t p oint ma y b e of aes t het ic s ignificance, as I have s aid, b ut no met a p h ys i ca l co n cl u s i ons follow
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from it . However, it is met ap hys ical conclus ions which Derrida and his dis cip les are supp os ed to b e es t ab lis hing. 2 ) Deco n s t r u ct i o n co n f u s es a s s er t i o n wi t h a r g u men t : T his is a p art icularly egregious mis t ake freq uent ly (and oft en arrogant ly) made b y t he p rop onent s of decons t ruct ion. Derrida is making, as we have s een, a met a p h ys i ca l claim about the nat ure of language and meaning: t hat t here are no t rans his t orical meanings or es s ences , and t hat all t ex t s can b e decons t ruct ed. However, any clos e reading of any of Derrida's major works reveals , I believe, t hat he does not att emp t to a r g u e fo r t his claim; rather, he s imp ly a s s er t s it over and over again.
15 For ex amp le, in t he es s ay on Plat o which we dis cus s ed ab ove, he is s up p os ed t o b e illus t rat ing t hat his claims ab out ident it y and d i f f ér a n ce are correct . According t o Derrida, Socrat es s eeks s elfknowledge, b ut he t hen adds t hat s uch knowledge is not t rans p arent , t hat it mus t b e "int erp ret ed, read, decip hered." However, t his is an as s ert ion, not an argument . It does nothing t o convince t he reader who b elieves s elfknowledge is t rans p arent and t hat Socrat es 's meaning is p erfect ly clear and t hat , alt hough alt ernat ive readings might b e p os s ib le, t hey are not legit imat e. O n p ages 7 0 7 1 , when dis cus s ing Socrat es 's s t ory of how t he maiden was p laying with Pharmacia, but was swept t o her deat h b y t he wind, Derrida p oint s out t hat t he word Ph a r ma ci a als o s ignifies t he adminis t rat ion of t he p h a r ma ko n , t he drug (which lit erally can mean eit her cure or p ois on). He t hen claims t hat "t his p h a r ma ko n , t his `medicine' . . . already int roduces it s elf int o t he b ody of t he dis cours e wit h all it s amb ivalence" (p .70 ). Derrida t hen goes on t o rep eat edly call the tex t the p h a r ma ko n . Again, no argument is offered for t his . He might claim in his defens e (alt hough he does not ) t hat h e s imp ly choos es t o emp has ize t he amb iguit y of t he word here, b ut t he p rob lem wit h t his move is t hat it does not p revent me from choos ing to avoid amb iguit y in favor of lit eralit y, and, even more imp ort ant , it does not hing t o convince us t hat we o u g h t t o p rivilege t he amb iguous reading.
16 Again (on p age 8 5 ), following up on his p revious as s ert ions , Derrida s ays t hat Plat o is cons t rained b y t he logic of ident it yb y t he s t andard op p os it ions of logic and realit y ("s p eech/ writ ing, life/ death, . . . inside/outside, . . . s erious nes s / p lay," et c.). He t hen p roceeds t o make a more ab s t ract claim: "His t oryhas b een p roduced in it s ent iret y in t he p h i l o s o p h i ca l difference b et ween myt h o s and l o g o s " (p .86 ). He claims on p .96 t hat t he word p h a r ma ko n is caught in a "chain of s ignificat ions ," and t hat t hes e s ignificat ions go on working in s p it e of Plat o's int ent ions . As he puts it, "Plato can n o t s ee t he links , can leave t hem in t he s hadow or b reak t hem up . And yet t hes e links go on working of t hems elves . In s p it e of him? t hanks t o him? in h i s t ex t ? o u t s i d e t he t ex t ? b ut t hen where? b et ween his t ex t and t he language? for what reader? at what moment ?" (p .96 ). O f cours e, t hes e s ignificat ions only go on working b ecaus e Derrida is f o r ci n g alt ernat ive meanings out of t he t ex t . He s ays t hat one can s up p res s t hes e alt ernat ive
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meanings if one wis hes , yet t hey are s t ill p res ent in t he t ex t . His p oint is t hat t his amb iguit y p recedes Plat o's decis ion in favor of lit erality"Plato decides in favor of a logic t hat does not t olerat e s uch p as s ages b et ween op p os ing s ens es of t he s ame word . . ." (p p .98 9 9 ). T rans lat ions are als o guilt y of imp os ing lit eralit y on a t ex t , or on a s et of meanings . What act ually hap p ens , Derrida as s ert s , is t hat t he t ex t d ef er s t he meaning, and s o t he clear dis t inct ions of Plat o are t hus b lurred`eit her/ or' t urns out t o b e `b ot h/ and.' He emp has izes t hat op p os it ions as s ert t hems elves in meaning, and, aft er rep eat ing t his p oint a d n a u s ea m, he concludes b y res t at ing his main t hes is : "Nonp res ence is p res ence. Différance, t he dis ap p earance of any originary p res ence, is a t o n ce t he condit ion of p os s ib ilit y a n d t he condit ion of t he imp os s ib ilit y of t rut h" (p .16 8 ). All he has done here, I am s ugges t ing, is t o a s s er t his main p oint s over and over again; he offers no argument or reas ons for why we s hould accep t thes e point s as t rue. One will search in vain for any dis cus s ion of t he nat ures of language, int ent ionalit y, meaning, knowledge or t rut h aimed at convincing t he reader t hat Derrida's key as s ert ions are t rue. It is for t his reas on t hat one cannot help b eing s us p icious of t he ob s cure writ ing s t yle t hat is t yp ical of p os t modernis m, es p ecially of Derrida's own work. Derrida asserts his main t hes es ab out language and realit y, ab out t ex t s and t heir meanings , every few pages in mos t of his main works , us ually b eneat h layers of rap idly changing, and oft en b arely p enet rab le, met ap hors , doub le and triple meanings, mult ip le references , p uns , imaginat ive and oft en s hocking imagery. Although t his writ ing s t yle is very difficult t o p enet rat e (and indeed is very clever and creat ive), I s ub mit t hat int erwoven t hroughout Derrida's many readings of p hilos op hical t ex t s lurks mainly t his one s ub s t ant ive claim rep eat ed over and over again, and t hat once one dis cerns his p hilos op hical s t yle, one can read his work quit e eas ily.
17 If Derrida cont inues t o ins is t t hat he is not p rop os ing a met ap hys ical t hes is he mus t show why not . He simp ly cannot make what for all t he world ap p ears t o b e a s et of met ap hys ical claims ab out language, meaning, and t ex t ual analys is and yet claim t hat t hey are n o t met ap hys ical claims wi t h o u t exp l a i n i n g wh y n o t . T his mis t ake of confus ing as sertion with argument is also very common in the work of Derrida's dis cip les .
3 ) Deco n s t r u ct i o n i s g u i l t y o f r el a t i vi s m: T his is p robably one of the mos t t renchant crit icis ms of decons t ruct ion, and ex p lains why decons t ruct ionis t t hinkers do all in t heir p ower t o avoid t his charge, and b ury t heir point s under mount ains of ob s cure language and terminology. But it is fair t o s ay t hat decons t ruct ion is guilt y of b ot h ep is t emological and moral relat ivis m.
It is int eres t ing t o p rob e t his is s ue b y as king t he q ues t ion of whet her or not a decons t ruct ionis t reading of a t ex t could f a i l , or b e wrong, on Derrida's view? Would it b e p os s ib le t o decons t ruct a t ex t i n co r r ect l y ?; t o offer an int erp ret at ion which was not legit imat e? For ex amp le, when teaching
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Plat o's Eu t h yp h r o , s up p os e a p rofes s or p rop os ed t he int erp ret at ion t hat Eut hyp hro was really p laying wit h Socrat es ; t hat he knows t he ans wer t o Socrat es 's q ues t ions all along, and fully unders t ands the dis t inct ion bet ween moralit y and religion, b ut t hinks t hat Socrat es 's views on t hes e mat t ers are s illy, s o he delib erat ely leads Socrat es on s o t hat he can lat er ridicule him to his friends . O r s up p os e t hat we read Hu ckl eb er r y Fi n n as proposing the view that J im is a racis t . Or t hat Huck is a racis t . Or t hat the novel is not ab out racial is s ues at all, b ut is really ab out t he Mis s is s ip p i river, which is a met ap hor for life. O r s up p os e we decide t o read Charles Dickens ' novels as b eing p rimarily ab out child ab us e. T he q ues t ion is : are t hes e readings accep t ab le? It is ob vious that t his is a crucial ques t ion. If a decons t ruct ionis t reading of a t ex t could not fail, t his s eems t o imp ly t hat a n y reading of a t ex t i s legit imat e, and if it could fail, which (we now know from our reading of "Plat o's Pharmacy") is Derrida's official answer t o our q ues t ion, t hen yet again we are cons t rained b y t he met ap hys ics of p res ence. For we have s een t hat Derrida b elieves t hat alt ernat ive readings mus t s t ill have genuine links t o t he t ex t . So a "correct " decons t ruct ionis t reading imp lies t hat t here are cert ain readings which are legitimate, and certain readings which are not legit imat e. When we work wit h a t ex t , we mus t reveal only t he legit imat e readings . T here is a r i g h t and a wr o n g way to read tex t s for Derrida after all, it is jus t a lit t le b it more elas t ic t han t he t radit ional right way. But t his p air of ident it ies illus t rat es again t hat we are unab le to avoid the met ap hys ics of pres ence. Now if Derrida claims t hat when we read t ex t s our only t as k is t o reveal t he op erat ion of d i f f ér a n ce in t he t ex t which means that we cannot p rivilege t he lit eral meaninghe is s t ill claiming t hat t here is a right way and a wrong way t o read t ex t s , and s o is s t ill undermining his position that a l l readings can b e decons t ruct ed. But it is fuzzines s ab out jus t t hes e kinds of is s ues which has right ly earned Derrida and his dis cip les t he rep ut at ion for advocat ing t he view t hat meaning, and s t andard logic and rat ionalit y, are arb it rary.
Let us b riefly glance b ack at t he s ugges t ions I made for alt ernat ive readings of wellknown t ex t s . Sup p os e t hat ins t ead of s aying t hat Hu ckl eb er r y Fi n n is ab out t he Mis s is s ip p i River, which is a met aphor for life, we s aid t hat t he novel is ab out t he Mis s is s ip p i River, and t he river is a met ap hor for t he op p res s ion of worldviews , es p ecially unconvent ional worldviews . O ne can s ee immediat ely how t his int erp ret at ion would appeal to decons t ruct ionis t t hinkers b ecaus e it s up p ort s t heir p olit ical agenda. In s hort, t hey might b e inclined t o accep t t his reading as legit imat e. O r t o put it another way: t his is t he kind of alt ernat ive reading which t hey would likely come up wit h t hems elves , or which t hey would s up p ort . However, t his t hought ex p eriment illus t rat es t he nat ure of t he difficult y for t he decons t ruct ionis t . T his reading has no more legit imacy than any ot her reading if any reading is p ermis s ib le; it cannot b e morally b et t er, or t ex t ually more ap p rop riat e, or p hilos op hically more accep t ab le t han t he ot her alt ernat ives I ment ioned. T he
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only reas on a group might work wit h t his reading is t hat it s up p ort s t heir b ias es and p rejudices and int eres t s , which have been formed by their cult ure and t radit ion and p ers onal s it uat ion, b ut which are not objectively true. Hence, decons t ruct ion is commit t ed t o moral relat ivis m in t he s ens e t hat no s et of meanings is morally p referab le t o any ot her, and it is commit t ed t o ep is t emological relat ivis m b ecaus e any reading of a t ex t can be s hown to b e legit imat e. If on t he ot her hand, t o avoid t his difficulty, postmodernist thinkers ins is t t hat t h ei r reading or int erp ret at ion is right or t rue or b et t er t han ot her alt ernat ives , t hen t hey are recognizing a realm of ob ject ive t rut h, which undermines t he whole p roject of decons t ruct ion. Furt her, and jus t as imp ort ant , if t hey choos e t his lat t er op t ion t hey are now ob liged t o debate with ot hers who agree t hat t here is a realm of ob ject ive t rut h, b ut who disagree with t he decons t ruct ionis t s ab out it s nat ure. T hes e difficult ies us ually leave decons t ruct ionis t s wit h an incons is t ent relat ivis m, and it is no wonder that they do t heir b es t t o ob fus cat e t his fact . T his p romp t s us t o s t at e t his inconsistency more ex p licit ly. 18 4 ) Deco n s t r u ct i o n i s s el f co n t r a d i ct o r y : Let me t urn now to the self cont radict ory nat ure of decons t ruct ion. T he t wo realms of p res ence and of d i f f ér a n ce ident ified b y Derrida are p art of his overall view ( h i s ob ject ive, "G od's eye" view) of how t hings really are. T hey are s up p os ed t o reveal t o us what is really t he cas e, or how ob ject s r ea l l y s t a n d . T he realm of d i f f ér a n ce , in p art icular, informs us t hat ob ject s are never s elfcont ained, never s elfident ical, never cont ain t heir es s ence s imp ly wit hin t hems elves , b ut are always es s ent ially "influenced" b y t hos e ot her "ob ject s " in t he s ys t em (what ever t his could p os s ib ly mean in p ract ice). But s ince this "influencing" is cons t ant ly changing and b eing deferred, meaning, and hence any ident it ies or p res ences or lit eral meanings which emerge in and t hrough meaning, are never t he whole s t ory. However, if all t his is t he cas e, t hen, for Derrida, it would b e t r u e t o s ay t hat realit y is d i f f ér a n ce , and not p res ence. T his p oint is nicely s up p ort ed b y t he fact t hat Derrida's works are full of s ub s t ant ive (or met ap hys ical) claims a b o u t t h e n a t u r es o f l a n g u a g e a n d mea n i n g , e.g., "Writ ing can never b e t ot ally inhab it ed b y t he voice." 19 O r: "T he t r a ce is not hing, it is not an ent it y, it ex ceeds the ques t ion Wh a t i s ? and cont ingent ly makes it p os s ib le." 20 O r: ". . . t he not ions of p rop ert y, ap p rop riat ion and s elf p res ence, s o cent ral to logocent ric met ap hys ics , are es s ent ially dep endent on an op p os it ional relat ion wit h ot hernes s . In t his s ens e, ident it y p r es u p p o s es alt erit y." 21 T hes e are t he l i t er a l mea n i n g s which Derrida wis hes us t o t ake away from h i s t ex t s . T his p oint is furt her confirmed in t he work of Derrida's dis cip les , which is als o rep let e wit h met ap hys ical claims ; J as p er Neel, for ex amp le, illus t rat es t his very ap t ly indeed when he s ays "Plat o is wrong and Derrida is right ."
T he cont radict ion is ob vious : if we o u g h t to read Plat o according to t he p rincip les of decons t ruct ion, t hen t his is a met a p h ys i ca l claim about the nat ure of knowledge, and Derrida is cont radict ing his general view that there is
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no one legit imat e met hod for reading and int erp ret ing t ex t s . O r, on t he ot her hand, if he s ays t hat t he decons t ruct ion of Plat o is only a s u g g es t i o n , one p os s ib ilit y among ot hers , t hen we are (met ap hys ically) free t o reject it , and t here is not hing wrong wit h p rivileging l i t er a l meanings aft er all. But this too is a cont radict ion b ecaus e he has b een t rying t o p ers uade us t hat we should not p rivilege lit eral meanings . T his is a s t raight forward logical difficult y wit h t he p hilos op hy of decons t ruct ion. Decons t ruct ionis t s s omet imes rep ly t o t his p oint b y s aying t hat t heir t heory is not vulnerab le t o logical crit icis ms b ecaus e logic it s elf is p recis ely what is b eing called int o q ues t ion, at leas t at t he b eginning of t he enq uiry. Since t hey are calling logic int o q ues t ion, t hey are not ans werab le t o logical ob ject ions . However, t his is clearly a q ues t ionb egging move. For it is ex act ly t h i s p o i n t ab out logic which Derrida and his dis cip les are s up p os ed to b e es t ab lis hing. This conclus ion can only come (if it comes at all) at t he en d of t he enq uiry. O ne cannot ass ume it s truth in the premis es of the argument wit hout b egging t he q ues t ion. I b elieve t hat t his logical p rob lem is ins urmount ab le, and p rovides a reas on for why s ome p hilos op hers like Rort y are p rop elled t oward a wholes cale relat ivis m of t he Derridean variet y. (Whet her t hey act ually maint ain t his relat ivis m co n s i s t en t l y , es p ecially in t he et hical domain, is anot her ques t ion, of cours e.)
Derrida is well known for making t he claim t hat it is p os s ib le t o decons t ruct his o wn work. But t his claim mus t b e unders t ood in the context of t he ab ove crit ical dis cus s ion. For t his can only mean (a) t hat different concep t s , met ap hors , et c., could b e emp loyed t o illus t rat e t he realit y of d i f f ér a n ce , b ut it cannot mean (b ) t hat d i f f ér a n ce mi g h t n o t b e the way things r ea l l y a r e . T hat is t o s ay, he can only mean b y claiming t hat his own work can b e decons t ruct ed t hat t he s u b s t a n t i ve p oint s he is making about deconstruction could b e exp r es s ed or i l l u s t r a t ed in a different way (which is really a t rivial p oint ). But he cannot mean t hat we could read his works and deconstruct them in s uch a way as t o conclude t hat his met ap hys ical or s ub s t ant ive claims about how t ex t s ought t o b e read (and ab out language and realit y) are not t r u e . For if we could read Derrida in t his way, t hen we would b e free t o reject t he decons t ruct ionis t app roach to t ex t s , and adop t the tradit ional app roach!
5 ) Deco n s t r u ct i o n i s g u i l t y o f i n t el l ect u a l a r r o g a n ce b eca u s e i t s p r o p o n en t s i n s i s t t h a t t h ei r ma i n cl a i ms ca n s t i l l h a ve t h e i mp o r t o f t r u t h even i f t h e cl a i ms a r e f a l s e : T his las t crit icis m is very nicely illus t rat ed in s ome remarks b y Lawrence Cahoone. I q uot e him here b ecaus e his ap p roach will help to b ring some of t he p oint s I have b een making t oget her, and it als o illus t rat es t he t ot ally q ues t ionb egging nat ure of p os t modernis t p hilos op hy. Here is Cahoone comment ing on s ome of t he crit icis ms levelled at p os t modernis m:
The charge of self contr adiction is an imp or tant one; nevertheless, it is a purely negative argument that does nothing to b lunt the criticisms p ostmodernism makes of
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tr aditional inq uir y. The sometimes ob scur e r hetor ical str ategies of p ostmodernism make sense if one accep ts its critiq ue of such inq uir y. To say then that the postmodern critiq ue is invalid b ecause the kind of theor y it p r oduces does not meet the standards of tr aditional or nor mal inq uir y is a r ather weak counterattack. It says in effect that whatever critiq ue does not advance the interests of tr aditional inq uir y is invalid. The same charge was made against the very patr on saint of philosop hy, Socr ates, whose infernal q uestioning, it was said, led to nothing p ositive and p r actical, undermined socially imp or tant b eliefs, and could not justify itself excep t for his eccentr ic claim to b e on a mission fr om God ( in Plato's Ap o lo g y) . So, while the thr eat of self contr adiction does r aise a serious p r ob lem for p ostmodernism, one that would prevent p ostmodernism fr om r egarding itself as valid in the way tr aditional p hilosop hies hope to b e, that fact does nothing to show that nor mal inq uir y is immune to its critiq ue. Postmodernism r aises a serious challenge which cannot b e so easily dismissed. Whether it is rig h t, is, of cour se, another matter, and one that is up to the r eader to 22 decide. What is very revealing ab out Cahoone's p os it ion is t hat he ob vious ly b elieves t hat even though decons t ruct ion may be cont radict ory, it can s t ill funct ion as an effect ive crit iq ue of t radit ional p hilos op hy! T his kind of claim is obviously fals e, and rep res ent s yet anot her s light of hand from t he decons t ruct ionis t s . It is t rue t hat t he charge of s elfcont radict ion is mos t ly a negat ive argument , b ut t his is ap p rop riat e b ecaus e it s t ill demons t rat es t hat decons t ruct ion is eit her cont radict ory or relat ivis t ic, as I have ex p lained ab ove, and t hes e are b ot h ex cellent reas ons for reject ing it . It is a devas t at ing counterattack, not a rather weak one. O r does Cahoone t hink t hat if he s up p ort s a s elfcont radict ory or a relat ivis t ic p hilos op hy, he does not have t o defend it , and t hat t he b urden of p roof is on his op p onent s ?
Cahoone s ugges t s t hat b ecaus e t radit ional p hilos op hy ins is t s on s t andards of logic and rat ionalit y, it cannot offer a s erious at t ack on p os t modernis m. Now why is t his ? Is it b ecaus e p os t modernis m reject s t radit ional s t andards of logic and rat ionalit y? I hop e I have s hown ab ove t hat t his claim is t ot ally unconvincing b ecaus e it is as s ert ed and not argued for, and is s imp ly q ues t ionb egging. O r is it b ecaus e t rut h is relat ive (which would als o include logic and rat ionalit y in t his cas e)? T his move is als o q ues t ion b egging becaus e this is what Cahoone is supp os ed to es t ab lis h, s o he cannot a s s u me it in his crit iq ue of t radit ional p hilos op hy. (Furt her, of cours e, p os t modernis t s us ually t ry t o deny t hat t rut h is relat ive.) It is als o s ugges t ive t o not e t he rhet oric emp loyed b y Cahoone. Ins t ead of t alking ab out "t he t radit ional s t andards of logic and rat ionalit y," he t alks ab out "advancing t he int eres t s of t radit ional inq uiry" t hereb y t rying t o carry his argument b y invoking welles t ab lis hed cont emp orary rhet oric, which s ugges t s op p res s ion and ex clus ion. Cahoone is clearly s aying t hat t he p os t modernis t crit iq ue of t radit ional p hilos op hy can funct ion even if p os t modernis m t urns out t o b e cont radict ory. T his again is a good illus t rat ion of how t he p os t modernis t s want t o have t heir cake and eat it : t hey want t o avoid offering any argument in
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s up p ort of t heir main claims (b ecaus e t hes e claims are indefens ib le, for t he reas ons I have ex p lained ab ove), and yet claim t hat t heir p hilos op hical res ults are st ill valid. In general, decons t ruct ionis t t hinkers avoid facing up t o t hes e crit ical p oint s I have rais ed ab ove, and oft en t ry t o dodge t hem. It is virt ually imp os s ib le to find a mains t ream work in decons t ruct ionis t p hilos op hy which acknowledges t hes e difficult ies , and t ries t o deal wit h t hem, like any hones t t hinker s hould. Pos t modernis t s know very well t hat t heir work is op en t o charges of s elfcont radict ion, relat ivis m, lack of p hilos op hical foundation and int ellect ual arrogance, and s ince t hes e p os it ions are not orious ly difficult t o defend, it is not s urp ris ing t hat t hey t ry t o deflect t he clear light of reason from landing on t heir ideas . T hey do t his b y adop t ing a very ob s cure and almos t imp enet rab le writ ing s t yle, and it is no wonder t hat t his s t yle makes many p hilos op hers susp icious that what we are really s eeing here is t he King's new clot hes b et ween t he covers ! But t here is a very s erious p oint here, which I will s t at e in t he form of t wo q ues t ions (wit h which I will conclude): is it not int ellect ually irres p ons ib le t o avoid facing up t o legit imat e and oft enrais ed crit icis ms of one's ideas b y s erious t hinkers ? And, las t ly, s hould wecan we t ake a p hilos op hy serious ly that refus es to do so?
ENDNO T ES
1 . Th e Po s t mo d er n Co n d i t i o n : A Rep o r t o n Kn o wl ed g e (Minneap olis : Univers it y of Minnes ot a Pres s , 1 9 8 4 ) p. xx iv.
2 . Derrida's major works include: S p eech a n d Ph en o men a a n d Ot h er Es s a ys
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i n Hu s s er l ' s Th eo r y o f S i g n s , t rans . b y D. B. Allis on (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1 9 7 3 ); Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , t rans . b y G . Sp ivak (Balt imore: J ohns Hop kins , 1 9 7 6 ); Wr i t i n g a n d Di f f er en ce , t rans . b y A. Bas s (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 7 8 ); Di s s emi n a t i o n , t rans . b y B. J ohns on (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 8 1 ); Ma r g i n s o f Ph i l o s o p h y , trans. b y A. Bas s (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 8 2 ); Gl a s , t rans . b y J.P. Leavey, J r. and R. Rand (Lincoln: Univers it y of Neb ras ka Pres s , 1 9 8 6 ). See als o a s eries of int erviews wit h Derrida in Po s i t i o n s , t rans . b y A. Bas s (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 8 1 ). For a brief but helpful synopsis of Derrida's major works b y S. Crit chley and T . Mooney, s ee Twen t i et h Cen t u r y Con t i n en t a l Ph i l o s o p h y , ed. Richard Kearney (London: Rout ledge, 1 9 9 4 ) pp . 4 6 0 4 6 7 . 3 . Ma r g i n s o f Ph i l o s o p h y , p p . 2 1 2 5 . See als o Derrida's remarks in his int erview wit h Richard Kearney in Kearney's Di a l o g u es wi t h Co n t emp o r a r y Co n t i n en t a l Th i n ker s (Manches t er: Manches t er U.P., 1 9 8 4 ) p . 1 1 0 1 1 1 , and p . 1 1 7 .
4 . See Wr i t i n g a n d Di f f er en ce , p p . 1 1 2 1 1 3 . T he fact t hat t he realm of d i f f ér a n ce never occurs wit hout cognit ive knowledge als o means t hat we a r e imp ris oned in language, an imp licat ion of his t hought which Derrida wishes to res is t (s ee R. Kearney, Di a l o g u es wi t h Co n t emp o r a r y Co n t i n en t a l Th inkers, p . 1 2 3 ). But if all ident it ies are co n s t r u ct s of t he mind, and we cannot operate wit hout ident it ies in our dis cours e and language, t hen it seems to follow that we are imp ris oned in language. T o look at t he is s ue from anot her angle, if, as Derrida b elieves , t here are no ident it ies b eyond language, for all p ract ical p urp os es t his amount s t o t he s ame t hing as s aying t hat t here is nothing beyond language.
5 . As des crib ed b y J ohn St urrock in S t r u ct u r a l i s m a n d S i n ce , ed. J ohn St urrock (Ox ford: Ox ford U.P., 1 9 7 9 ) p. 58 .
6 . Rea l i t y Is n ' t Wh a t i t Us ed t o Be (San Francis co: Harp er and Row, 1 9 9 0) p. 8 7 .
7 . See "Is Derrida a T rans cendent al Philos op her?," Wo r ki n g Th r o u g h Der r i d a , ed. G ary B. Madis on (Evans t on: Nort hwes t ern U.P., 1 9 9 3 ) p p . 1 3 7 1 4 6 .
8 . Ib i d ., p. 13 7 .
9 . Ib i d .
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1 0 . See Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , p p . 1 0 1 8 , and p . 4 3 , for a dis cus s ion of "logocent ricis m." 1 1 . Dis s eminat ion, p p . 9 8 9 9 .
1 2 . See Yoav Rinon, "T he Rhet oric of J acq ues Derrida I: Plat o's Pharmacy," Revi ew o f Met a p h ys i cs 4 6 (1 9 9 2 ) p p . 3 6 9 3 8 6 , and Yoav Rinon, "T he Rhet oric of J acq ues Derrida II: Ph a ed r u s ," Revi ew o f Met a p h ys i cs 4 6 (1993) p p . 5 3 7 5 5 8 . It is ins t ruct ive t o comp are Rinon's reading wit h Chris t op her Norris 's in his Der r i d a (Camb ridge: Harvard U.P., 1 9 8 7 ) pp . 2 8 4 5 .
1 3 . Di s s emi n a t i o n , p . 1 2 9 .
1 4 . Ib i d ., p. 13 0 .
1 5 . Ib i d ., p. 69 .
1 6 . Again, t he concep t of s up p res s ion s ugges t s t hat t o ignore t hes e meanings is mo r a l l y inap p rop riat e.
1 7 . For ot her ex amp les of Derrida's failure t o p rovide an argument t o s up p ort his radical as s ert ions , s ee Wr i t i n g a n d Di f f er en ce , p p . 1 7 8 1 8 1 ; pp. 278282; Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , p p . 6 1 5 ; pp . 3 0 3 8 ; p p . 4 4 5 0 ; Ma r g i n s o f Ph i l o s o p h y , p p . 1 2 7 ; p p . 9 5 1 0 8 ; p p . 2 0 9 2 1 9 . (Derrida's amb ivalence b et ween rep et it ion/ demons t rat ion is int eres t ingly alluded to in Po s i t i o n s , p . 5 2 .) T he s ame problem is ob vious in much of the secondary lit erat ure on Derrida. As an illus t rat ion, s ee Chris t op her Norris , Der r i d a , es p ecially Chap t ers Two and T hree. See als o J onat han Culler's es s ay on Derrida in S t r u ct u r a l i s m a n d S i n ce , ed. J ohn St urrock (O x ford: O x ford U.P., 1 9 7 9 ) p p . 1 5 4 1 8 0 . Culler's es s ay p res ent s a wellorganized, clear and readab le overview of Derrida's major t hes es ab out language, realit y, meaning and t ex t ual analys is , b ut offers no argument s or reas ons for why we should accep t thes e claims as t rue or at leas t p laus ib le. Dallas Willard argues forcefully in a recent es s ay t hat Derrida's view of int ent ionalit y is s imilarly afflict ed b y t he ab s ence of s up p ort ing reas ons and argument . Willard illus t rat es t hat it is not s o much t hat Derrida's account of int ent ionalit y is wrong as t hat it is really no account at all of int ent ionalit y. See Dallas Willard, "Predication as Originary Violence: A Phenomenological Crit iq ue of Derrida's View of Int ent ionalit y" in Working Th r o u g h Der r i d a , ed. G ary B. Madis on, p p . 1 2 0 1 3 6 .
1 8 . Ma r g i n s of Ph i l o s o p h y , p . 9 5 .
1 9 . Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , p . 7 5 .
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2 0 . Derrida is his int erview wit h Richard Kearney in Kearney's Dialogues with Co n t emp o r a r y Con t i n en t a l Thi n ker s , p . 1 1 7 . 2 1 . Pl a t o , Der r i d a a n d Wr i t i n g (Carb ondale: Sout hern Illinois Univers it y Pres s , 1 9 8 8 ) p. xii.
2 2 . Fr o m Po s t mo d er n i s m t o Mo d er n i s m: An An t h o l o g y (O x ford: Blackwell, 1 9 9 5 ) p . 2 1 . 2 2 . Th e Po s t mo d er n Co n d i t i o n : A Rep o r t o n Kn o wl ed g e (Minneap olis : Univers it y of Minnes ot a Pres s , 1 9 8 4 ) p. xx iv.
2 2 . Derrida's major works include: S p eech a n d Ph en o mena and Other Essays i n Hu s s er l ' s Th eo r y o f S i g n s , t rans . b y D. B. Allis on (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1 9 7 3 ); Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , t rans . b y G . Sp ivak (Balt imore: J ohns Hop kins , 1 9 7 6 ); Wr i t i n g a n d Di f f er en ce , t rans . b y A. Bas s (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 7 8 ); Di s s emi n a t i o n , t rans . b y B. J ohns on (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 8 1 ); Ma r g i n s o f Ph i l o s o p h y , trans. b y A. Bas s (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 8 2 ); Gl a s , t rans . b y J.P. Leavey, J r. and R. Rand (Lincoln: Univers it y of Neb ras ka Pres s , 1 9 8 6 ). See als o a s eries of int erviews wit h Derrida in Po s i t i o n s , t rans . b y A. Bas s (Chicago: Univers it y of Chicago Pres s , 1 9 8 1 ). For a brief but helpful synopsis of Derrida's major works b y S. Crit chley and T . Mooney, s ee Twen t i et h Cen t u r y Con t i n en t a l Ph i l o s o p h y , ed. Richard Kearney (London: Rout ledge, 1 9 9 4 ) pp . 4 6 0 4 6 7 .
2 2 . Ma r g i n s o f Ph i l o s o p h y , p p . 2 1 2 5 . See als o Derrida's remarks in his int erview wit h Richard Kearney in Kearney's Di a l o g u es wi t h Co n t emp o r a r y Co n t i n en t a l Th i n ker s (Manches t er: Manches t er U.P., 1 9 8 4 ) p . 1 1 0 1 1 1 , and p . 1 1 7 .
2 2 . See Wr i t i n g a n d Di f f er en ce , p p . 1 1 2 1 1 3 . T he fact t hat t he realm of d i f f ér a n ce never occurs wit hout cognit ive knowledge als o means t hat we a r e imp ris oned in language, an imp licat ion of his t hought which Derrida wishes to res is t (s ee R. Kearney, Di a l o g u es wi t h Co n t emp o r a r y Co n t i n en t a l Th inkers, p . 1 2 3 ). But if all ident it ies are co n s t r u ct s of t he mind, and we cannot operate wit hout ident it ies in our dis cours e and language, t hen it seems to follow that we are imp ris oned in language. T o look at t he is s ue from anot her angle, if, as Derrida b elieves , t here are no ident it ies b eyond language, for all p ract ical p urp os es t his amount s t o t he s ame t hing as s aying t hat t here is nothing beyond language.
2 2 . As des crib ed b y J ohn St urrock in S t r u ct u r a l i s m a n d S i n ce , ed. J ohn St urrock (Ox ford: Ox ford U.P., 1 9 7 9 ) p. 58 .
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2 2 . Rea l i t y Isn ' t Wh a t i t Us ed t o Be (San Francis co: Harp er and Row, 1 9 9 0 ) p . 8 7 . 7 . See "Is Derrida a T rans cendent al Philos op her?," Wo r ki n g Th r o u g h Der r i d a , ed. G ary B. Madis on (Evans t on: Nort hwes t ern U.P., 1 9 9 3 ) p p . 1 3 7 1 4 6 .
2 2 . Ib i d ., p. 13 7 .
2 2 . Ib i d .
2 2 . See Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , p p . 1 0 1 8 , and p . 4 3 , for a dis cus s ion of "logocent ricis m."
2 2 . Dis s eminat ion, p p . 9 8 9 9 .
2 2 . See Yoav Rinon, "T he Rhet oric of J acq ues Derrida I: Plat o's Pharmacy," Revi ew o f Met a p h ys i cs 4 6 (1 9 9 2 ) p p . 3 6 9 3 8 6 , and Yoav Rinon, "T he Rhet oric of J acq ues Derrida II: Ph a ed r u s ," Revi ew o f Met a p h ys i cs 4 6 (1993) p p . 5 3 7 5 5 8 . It is ins t ruct ive t o comp are Rinon's reading wit h Chris t op her Norris 's in his Der r i d a (Camb ridge: Harvard U.P., 1 9 8 7 ) pp . 2 8 4 5 .
2 2 . Di s s emi n a t i o n , p . 1 2 9 .
2 2 . Ib i d ., p. 13 0 .
2 2 . Ib i d ., p. 69 .
2 2 . Again, t he concep t of s up p res s ion s ugges t s t hat t o ignore t hes e meanings is mo r a l l y inap p rop riat e.
2 2 . For ot her ex amp les of Derrida's failure t o p rovide an argument t o s up p ort his radical as s ert ions , s ee Wr i t i n g a n d Di f f er en ce , p p . 1 7 8 1 8 1 ; pp. 278282; Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , p p . 6 1 5 ; pp . 3 0 3 8 ; p p . 4 4 5 0 ; Ma r g i n s o f Ph i l o s o p h y , p p . 1 2 7 ; p p . 9 5 1 0 8 ; p p . 2 0 9 2 1 9 . (Derrida's amb ivalence b et ween rep et it ion/ demons t rat ion is int eres t ingly alluded to in Po s i t i o n s , p . 5 2 .) T he s ame problem is ob vious in much of the secondary lit erat ure on Derrida. As an illus t rat ion, s ee Chris t op her Norris , Der r i d a , es p ecially Chap t ers Two and T hree. See als o J onat han Culler's es s ay on Derrida in S t r u ct u r a l i s m a n d S i n ce , ed. J ohn St urrock (O x ford: O x ford U.P., 1 9 7 9 ) p p . 1 5 4 1 8 0 . Culler's es s ay p res ent s a wellorganized, clear and readab le overview of Derrida's major t hes es ab out language, realit y, meaning and t ex t ual analys is , b ut offers no argument s or reas ons for why we should accep t thes e claims as t rue or at leas t p laus ib le. Dallas Willard argues forcefully in a recent es s ay t hat
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Derrida's view of int ent ionalit y is s imilarly afflict ed b y t he ab s ence of s up p ort ing reas ons and argument . Willard illus t rat es t hat it is not s o much t hat Derrida's account of int ent ionalit y is wrong as t hat it is really no account at all of int ent ionalit y. See Dallas Willard, "Predication as Originary Violence: A Phenomenological Crit iq ue of Derrida's View of Int ent ionalit y" in Working Th r o u g h Der r i d a , ed. G ary B. Madis on, p p . 1 2 0 1 3 6 . 2 2 . Ma r g i n s of Ph i l o s o p h y , p . 9 5 .
2 2 . Of Gr a mma t o l o g y , p . 7 5 .
2 2 . Derrida is his int erview wit h Richard Kearney in Kearney's Dialogues with Co n t emp o r a r y Con t i n en t a l Thi n ker s , p . 1 1 7 .
2 2 . Pl a t o , Der r i d a a n d Wr i t i n g (Carb ondale: Sout hern Illinois Univers it y Pres s , 1 9 8 8 ) p. xii.
2 2 . Fr o m Po s t mo d er n i s m t o Mo d er n i s m: An An t h o l o g y (O x ford: Blackwell, 1 9 9 5 ) p. 21 .
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