"FROZEN DEMOCRACY MYANMAR"

Perwujudan Demokrasi di Myanmar atau Burma tidak semudah yang di bayangkan di negara Asean lainnya, militer memiliki peranan yang cukup kuat, yang membedakan dengan Thailand adalah kudeta di Thailand sering terjadi dalam selang beberapa tahun saja pasca pemilu dan kesamaannya adalah dilakukan oleh sesama militer.

Myanmar merupakan bekas jajahan Inggris di mana Inggris merupakan negara cikal bakal hadirnya Demokrasi namun substansi demokrasi tidak bertumbuh dengan semestinya di negara bekas jajahannya. Demokrasi terjadi pada abad 18-19 yang dianggap sebagai masa kebangkitan demokrasi, demokrasi berawal dari kerajaan Inggris dengan pergerakan sosialnya berlangsung cepat, karena Inggris sebagai negara yang maju dari segi jurnalisme. Kolonialisasi yang dilakukan Inggris seharusnya secara tidak langsung memberikan dampak bagi wilayah jajahannya dalam hal transformasi nilai-nilai demokrasi, yang dapat disebar di seluruh dunia termasuk kepada Myanmar sebagai salah satu jajahan Kerajaan Inggris dahulu.

Akan tetapi meskipun Myanmar adalah jajahan Inggris, belum tentu nilai-nilai demokrasi Inggris dianut oleh masyarakat Myanmar, hal ini terbukti dengan rezim otoriter yang masih berkuasa di Myanmar dan membatasi peran aktor politik lain dalam hal ini sipil yang akan mewujudkan demokrasi di Myanmar, khususnya Aung San Suu Kyi ( Suu Kyi ) yang pernah menerima penghargaan nobel Perdamaian bahkan memenangi pemilu tetapi tidak diakui kemenangan yang diraih, padahal Myanmar merupakan tanah kelahirananya.

Budaya Kudeta yang dilakukan di Myanmar oleh para petinggi militer merupakan salah satu faktor mandeknya perwujudan demokrasi di Myanmar atau Burma. Kudeta terhadap pemerintahan Myanmar untuk menguatkan posisi pemerintahan maka sangat dibutuhkan sebuah sistem pemerintahan yang dapat menjamin keberlangsungan pemerintahan itu dengan baik.

Sistem pemerintahan yang dianut merupakan sebuah strategi kekuasaan untuk melanggengkan kekuasaan menurut pengamat Politik ; M. Alfan Alfian, Sejarah Myanmar dapat dilihat sejak awal kemerdekaan, 4 Januari 1948, sebagai republik independen Union of Burma, dengan Sao Shwe Thaik sebagai Presiden dan U Nu sebagai Perdana Menteri. Demokrasi di Myanmar terhenti pada 1962, ketika Jenderal Ne Win melancarkan kudeta dan sempat mengendalikan pemerintahan selama 26 tahun. Junta militer yang otoriter memperkokoh cengkeraman kekuasannya melalui kudeta dan membatasi ruang gerak kaum oposisi pro-demokrasi. Demonstrasi-demonstrasi pro-demokrasi seperti yang telah terjadi pada 1974, 1988 dan 2007 ini, selalu dihadapi dengan kekerasan militer. Pada 1988 Jenderal Saw Maung melakukan kudeta dan membentuk pemerintahan yang dikenal sebagai State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Pada 1989, SLORC mengumumkan keadaan darurat untuk memukul para demonstran pro-demokrasi. Pada 1989 rezim SLORC mengubah nama Burma menjadi Myanmar (alfanalfian.multiply.com)

Pemerintahan yang di kenal dengan SLORC atau Dewan Pemulihan Hukum dan Peraturan, lembaga yang bersifat kolektif yang diduduki oleh sejumlah petinggi militer merupakan sebuah strategi agar bagaimana pemerintahan dapat dikendalikan, bentuk pemerintahan ini dipakai sebagai kekuatan hukum atau sebagai sebuah upaya konstitusional dalam menjalankan pemerintahan, awal keberadaan SLORC bertujuan menekankan bahwa SLORC dalam pemerintahannya akan memperjuangkan transisi dari militer ke sipil, dimana menyiapkan kebutuhan pemerintahan sipil yang demokratis berdasarkan hasil pemilu.

Keberadaan SLORC sebagai lembaga pemerintahan transisional untuk menyiapkan pemilu yang demokratis dan menyiapkan kepemimpinan sipil namun persoalannya ketika Pemilu1990 junta militer tidak mengakui kemenangan NLD, padahal hasil pemilu menunjukkan kemenangan NLD, kali ini kemenangan yang sarat dengan kecurangan dan rekayasa junta militer tidak diakui oleh NLD. NLD didirikan pada 27 September 1988, dan Aung San Suu Kyi adalah warga sipil Myanmar yang merupakan pemimpin partai NLD.
Pertanyaan pembahasan kita yakni, Apa yang menyebabkan Pemerintahan Junta Militer yang membentuk diri dalam SLORC tidak menyerahkan tambuk kekuasaan ke tangan sipil tetapi merekaya konstitusi untuk menghambat berkuasanya sipil ? Artikel ini akan membahas secara teoritis mengapa junta militer begitu kuatnya di Myanmar sehingga tidak menyerahkan kekuasan ini ke tangan sipil, dari sudut pandang Pretorianisme Samuel Huntington.

Menurut Samuel P. Huntington dalam bukunya Tertib Politik menjelaskan bahwa, di dalam Oligarki Pretorian perjuangan untuk memperoleh kekuasaan seringkali dibarengi dengan kudeta tetapi aksinya hanya merupakan “revolusi istana” ketika satu anggota oligarki mengganti kedudukan anggota lain tanpa menumpahkan darah. Kepemimpinan puncak memang mengalami perubahan, tetapi di dalam ruang lingkup wewenang pemerintahan atau partisipasi tidak terjadi perubahan yang berarti dan landasan legitimasi sebagaimana halnya kerajaan mulai berakhir dan slogan serta program baru revolusi dan pembangunan nasional mulai disebarluaskan (Samuel P. Huntington - Rajawali Pers – 2004)

Sedangkan menurut Saurip Kadi mengungkapkan bahwa, Kondisi masyarakat pretorian inilah yang mendorong militer untuk terlibat dalam politik karena masyarakatnya berupaya masuk ke dalam politik untuk memperjuangkan kepentingan masyarakat secara keseluruhan meskipun bangunan politiknya belum mapan (Saurip Kadi – PARRHESIA - 2006)

Kondisi inilah yang mendorong militer Burma atau Myanmar untuk menguasai kekuasaan karena keadaan politik yang belum mapan. Penguasaan militer terhadap pemerintahan Myanmar memiliki kesamaan dengan apa yang terjadi di Indonesia pada masa Orde Baru dimana tentara Myanmar adalah para pejuang untuk memperjuangkan kemerdekaan Burma/Myanmar dari kolonialisme Inggris.

Dalam perkembangan masyarakat pretorian diperhadapkan dengan kemajuan peradaban dimana pemikiran pemerintahan yang semakin mengalami perkembangan dengan hadirnya bentuk-bentuk model pemerintahan seperti demokrasi, yang walaupun peranan militer dibutuhkan untuk turut campur tangan di bidang politik untuk mengatasi mala petaka atau kekacauan politik dalam sebuah negara sehingga terciptanya stabilitas dan integrasi bangsa.

Namun semangat demokrasi memiliki nilai-nilai yang dapat diterima digalang memenuhi seantero masyarakat dunia, yang mana esensi nurani demokrasi yang menekankan bahwa para anggota militer pada kesempatan yang sama harus menyerahkan kembali kekuasaan kepada pemerintahan sipil melalui pemilihan umum.

Keberadaan Militer yang kuat di Myanmar yang cukup mengakar dengan membuat konstruksi bangunan konstitusi untuk mendukung keberadaan mereka semakin membuat demokrasi hanyalah wacana dan tidak mewujudkan demokrasi yang sesungguhnya dimana kekuasaan di tangan sipil.

Di Awal abad ke 18, Myanmar menjadi bagian dari wilayah jajahan Inggris ( Indian Empire ). Merdeka di tahun 1948 Myanmar mengalami instabilitas politik karena perpecahan dalam partai yang berkuasa ( AFPL ). Myanmar menganut politik multi partai dan mengakui adanya 10 partai. Pemerintahan SPDC ( State Peace and Development / Dewan Ketentraman dan Pembangunan Negara ) masih merupakan pemerintahan sementara menunggu terbentuknya konstitusi baruyalah akal-akalan junta militer untuk memperpanjang kekuasaanya, Dalam kurun waktu yang cukup panjang Myanmar merdeka namun dalam perkembangannya tidaklah se-stabil negara lain yang ada di Asia Tenggara, karena gejolak pemerintahan dimana pemerintahannya berada dalam masyarakat pretorian.

Sebelum terbentuknya SPDC atau Dewan Ketentraman dan Pembangunan Negara lebih didahului dengan SLORC atau Dewan Pemulihan Hukum dan Peraturan, karena pada masa pemerintahan sekitar tahun 1988 menuju 1999 saat SLORC berdiri, keberadaannya lebih pada usaha untuk memulihkan keadaan darurat dalam negeri karena perpecahan dan kudeta yang terus melanda negeri ini.

Keberadaan SLORC mengalami tekanan dari berbagai pihak baik itu ‘bhiksu’ sebagai simbol masyarakat Myanmar yang jujur dan memiliki moral yang dapat di pertanggungjawabkan melakukan protes, karena merebaknya korupsi oleh para petinggi militer, kondisi Myanmar waktu itu menunjukan keadaan yang mencerminkan benar-benar masyarakat pretorian sebagaimana yang di ungkapkan oleh Samuel P. Huntington; Ciri khas yang menandai masyarakat praetorian adalah kalau daerah pedesaaan pasif dan masa pedesaan disingkirkan dari gelangang politik, dalam masyarakat pretorian tercipta kelompok menengah yang berani melawan dan berhadap-hadapan, kelompok yang khas dalam masyarakat pretorian ialah golongan terpelajar terutama mahasiswa di satu pihak dan kalangan militer dilain pihak dan kedua kelompok ini merupakan ciri khas masyarakat Pretorian.

Suku-suku kecil seperti “Karen” suku lainya tidak dilibatkan dalam proses bernegara, hanyalah suku Burma yang mayoritas mendapatkan peluang untuk terlibat dalam politik bahkan suku-suku lain bergerilya untuk memperjuangkan keberadaan komunitasnya dengan mengangkat senjata.

Di Myanmar kelompok menengah yang melakukan perlawanan terhadap militer tidak saja di lakukan oleh mahasiswa tetapi di lakukan oleh para ‘bhiksu’, akhirnya junta militer melakukan pengawasan terhadap gerak-gerik para bhiksu, dan demonstrasi mahasiswa besar-besar pada bulan maret-juni 1988 yang berujung mahasiswa ditembaki dan markas mereka di tutup oleh militer dan Universitas pun di tutup sementara untuk mematahkan kekuatan mahasiswa. Menurut M. Alfan Alfian bahwa dalam peristiwa itu Korban bergelimpangan. Itulah potret pendekatan militer dalam memberangus tuntutan demokrasi dan kebebasan publik. Penembakan oleh tentara yang antara lain menewaskan wartawan Jepang Kenji Nagai itu mengingatkan peristiwa-peristiwa sebelumnya, dimana demonstrasi damai dihadapi dengan kekerasan militer (alfanalfian.multiply.com)

Karena kesenjangan sosial antara masyarakat pedesaan dan kota dimana masyarakat kotayang hanya ingin mendapatkan suasana yang aman maka warga kota akan memilih untuk mengikuti saja apa yang diinginkan oleh junta militer dan memberlakukan keadaan darurat sebagaimana bagian dari SLORC dan kemudian dipoles lagi dengan sebutan SPDC.

Kondisi inilah yang memicu hadirnya gerakan demokrasi yang di perjuangkan oleh NLD, organisasi ini didirikan pada 27 September 1988 dan Aung San Suu Kyi yang saat itu baru tiba dari Oxford, bergabung dengan NLD hingga menjadi ketuanya.

NLD adalah partai prodemokrasi yang mendukung gerakan non-kekerasan terhadap demokrasi multi-partai di Burma. Partai ini juga mendukung hak asasi manusia (termasuk kebebasan berpidato dimuka umum), aturan hukum, dan rekonsiliasi nasional. Sejak pemerintah junta militer mencengkeram Burma, banyak sekali terjadi pelanggaran hak asasi manusia oleh junta militer. Tidak ada pengadilan yang independen dan junta militer menekan aktivitas politik oposisi. Diberitakan, pemerintah juga membatasi akses internet, termasuk memblokir dari Google, Gmail, Yahoo, dan Hotmail (www.tribunnews.com)

Kondisi masyarakat Myanmar yang mengharapkan demokrasi tidak dapat terwujud padahal awalnya keberadaan SLORC menekankan bahwa pemerintahannya merupakan transisi dari militer ke sipil; bahwa ada kebutuhan pemerintahan sipil yang demokratis hasil pemilu.

Alasan inilah yang mendorong Aung San Suu Kyi tetap bertekad untuk memperjuangkan demokrasi di Burma dan menegaskan akan melakukan revolusi yang ia sebut sebagai revolusi damai. Dengan kendaraan politik NLD, yang ibarat pepatah ‘ada tapi seperti tidak ada’, yakni ada tapi tak diakui pemerintah, mampukah Aung San Suu Kyi mewujudkan revolusi damainya dan membuat perubahan fundamental di Burma menjadi demokratis?

Perjuangannya sangat gigih sehingga NLD dapat hadir sebagai salah satu partai peserta pemilu Perkembangan politik terjadi pada bulan Mei 1990, tatkala pemerintah menggelar pemilu pertama kali sejak yang sejak 30 tahun sebelumnya.

Partai National League for Democracy (NLD) yang dipimpin oleh Aung San Suu Kyi, berhasil memenangkan 392 dari total 489 kursi yang diperebutkan. Namun SLORC membatalkan hasil pemilu tesebut. Ketua NLD Aung San Suu Kyi harus menerima hukuman sebagai tahanan rumah. Pemberangusan sipil untuk hadir dalam ruang publik dalam mewujudkan demokrasi menjadi tekad junta hanyalah bualan belaka. demokrasi substansial sepertinya hanyalah menghalau angin tanpa menuai hasil karena kekuatan junta yang cukup kuat.

Pemilu Burma 2010 ini sesungguhnya hanya pertarungan antara sesama partai yang didukung oleh junta militer, yakni USDP dan NUP. Karena pemilu kali ini tidak diikuti oleh partai oposisi prodemokrasi, NLD (National League for Democracy), yang dipimpin oleh Aung San Suu Kyi, anak salah satu founding fathers Burma, Aung San. KPU Burma pada September lalu secara resmi menghapus NLD dari daftar partai peserta pemilu.

Memecah Frozen Demokrasi

Partai Politik sebagai salah satu pilar demokrasi ada sebagai salah syarat demokrasi untuk membuktikan matangnya demokrasi disebuah negara, hal inilah yang mendorong Aung San Suu Kyi berjuang untuk mewujudkan demokrasi yang sesungguhnya. Menurut Reni Panuju bahwa; partai politik konon pertama kali lahir di Eropa Barat dengan latar belakang pemikiran bahwa rakyat merupakan faktor yang perlu diperhitungkan serta diikutsertakan dalam proses politik, selanjutnya apapun latar belakangnya partai politik merupakan saluran rasional untuk menampung dan memproses partisipasi politik masyarakat (Redi Panuju - Bhuana Ilmu Populer – 2011).

Namun semangat demokrasi yang dibangun oleh junta militer hanyalah untuk memenuhi standar demokrasi yakni adanya pemilu yang dilakukan secara bertahap, kemudian ada peserta partai politik yang walaupun partai peserta pemilu adalah partai bentukan junta militer yang di dalamnya peran SLORC, partai tersebut ada pada 2006, banyak anggota mengundurkan diri dari NLD, akibat tekanan dari Tatmadaw (Angkatan Bersenjata), dan Union Solidarity and Development Association (ASDA) yang dibentuk oleh junta militer pada 15 September 1993 sebelum kemudian pada 29 Maret 2009 dibentuk USDP sebagai wadah baru untuk ikut pemilu 2010. Semua anggota ASDA masuk USDP (www.tribunnews.com › Tribunners › Kolom Jurnalis).

Demokrasi yang telah di abaikan menyebabkan pelanggran HAM menjadi hal biasa dan lumrah di Myanmar, akhirnya peran sipil hanyalah sebagai penonton dan tidak terlibat untuk menciptakan demokrasi partisipatoris ataupun dan demokrasi deliberative, karena demokrasi dapat terwujud dengan baik jika kedaulatan di tangan rakyat dan bukan di tangan junta militer.

Larry Diamond dan Marc F. Plattner dalam buku yang mereka tulis bahwa; Peran rakyat dalam hal ini sipil merupakan tuntutan global kata sipil disini yakni bebasnya intervensi militer dalam politik, demokrasi harus menempatkan militer di bawah orotitas sipil sekaligus memberikan ruang yang cukup bagi militer untuk menjalankan pertimbangan professional dan kegiatan yang menjadi bidang mereka dalam batas-batas parameter kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh sipil.

Mereka (militer) melakukan intervensi ke dalam politik (apakah itu dengan kudeta atau dengan ekspansi kekuasaan dan hak prerogative secara gradual) ketika Politisi sipil dan partai politik lemah dan terpecah, dan ketika pemerintahan yang tidak utuh dan memanifestasikan kegagalan telah melahirkan kevakuman kekuasaan (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner - Rajawali Pers – 2000).

Kwalitas demokrasi sebuah negara dapat diukur apabila memiliki nilai yang berarti melalui keberadaan sipil dalam suatu negara dapat berpartisipasi dengan baik, politisi sipil tidak lemah dan kuat, serta memiliki tujuan yakni mampu mensejahterakan rakyat. Cita-cita ini akan terwujud dengan adanya keberadaan partai politik sebagai variabel yang memfasilitasi sipil untuk berperan aktif dalam pembangunan nasional dan perekonomian bangsa.

Peran sipil yang ideal harus mampu meramu kebijakan bagi militer agar keberadaan militer dapat berperan secara professional, dan tidak terjadi reorientasi misi militer, Supremasi sipil akan terwujud sebagai penentu terhadap keberadaan militer jika sipil mampu meramunya dalam konstitusi yang mengikat.

Demokrasi di Myanmar merumakan demokrasi yang mengalami kebekuan dimana ada penerapan demokrasi tetapi demokrasinya di kekang atau di bonsai semangat demokrasi yang seharusnya memberikan kebebasan serta peran utama kepada sipil tidak ada ruang yang tersedia.

Junta militer yag mengambil alih kekuasaan mendominasi bahkan menendalikan semua system pemerintahan dengan membentuk Dewan Peneguhan Hukum dan Peraturan (SLORC) dan kemudian berubah menjadi Dewan Ketentramann dan Pembangunan Negara hadir dengan nama yang soft namun dalam pelaksanaannya jauh dari harapan perilaku yang otoritarian serta melanggar Hak Azasi Manusia.

Sipil yang berupaya untuk mewujudkan supremasi sipil mengalami penekanan yang sangat luar biasa, pemilu di lakukan tetapi partai politik peserta pemilu adalah Partai Politik bentukan junta militer untuk mempertahankan kekuasaan. Sehingga model demokrasi nya dilakukan hanyalah memnuhi syarat bahwa ada proses demokratisasi namun nilai-nilai demokrasi tidaklah tampak atau terlihat di sana.

Peran Negara luar dalam hal in ASEAN, PBB sangat lemah guna membantu perwujudan demokrasi di Myanmar, karena ruang untuk melakukan intervensi diatur dalam kerjasama Negara-negara ASEAN, jalan satu-satunya untuk mencairkan demokrasi yang beku di Myanmar adalah peran sipil sendiri dimana perlunya peningkatan kapasitas sipil (civil society) untuk mewujudkan supremasi sipil melalui konsolidasi yang kuat dan menyiapkan pemimpin untuk menjalankan roda pemerintahan. Karena pemimpin yang kuat dan kharismatislah mampu mengembalikan junta militer sebagai militer yang profesional, dan militer yang di kendalikan oleh sipil melalui kebijakan-kebijakan.

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Direct Democracy

his belief is based on the right of every citizen over a certain age to attend political meetings, vote on the issue being discussed at that meeting and accepting the majority decision should such a vote lead to a law being passed which you as an individual did not support.
Part of this belief, is the right of every one to hold political office if they choose to do so. Direct democracy also believes that all people who have the right to, should actively participate in the system so that it is representative of the people and that any law passed does have the support of the majority.
Direct democracy gives all people the right to participate regardless of religious beliefs, gender, sexual orientation, physical well being etc. Only those who have specifically gone against society are excluded from direct democracy. In Britain, those in prison have offended society in some way and, therefore, their democratic rights are suspended for the duration of their time in prison. Once released, and having ‘learnt a lesson’, their democratic rights are once again restored.
Direct democracy is fine in theory but it does not always match the theory when put into practice. Direct democracy requires full participation from those allowed to. But how many people have the time to commit themselves to attending meetings especially when they are held mid-week during an afternoon? How many wish to attend such meetings after a day’ work etc?
If Britain has 40 million people who can involve themselves in politics if they wish, how could such a number be accommodated at meetings etc? Who would be committed to being part of this system day-in and day-out when such commitment would be all but impossible to fulfil? How many people have the time to find out about the issues being discussed whether at a local or a national level ? How many people understand these issues and the complexities that surround them? How many people understood the complexities of the problems surrounding the building of the Newbury by-pass, the installation of Tomahawk cruise missiles at Greenham Common etc?
If people are to be informed on such issues, who does this informing? How can you guarantee that such information is not biased? Who would have time to read all the information supporting the building of the Newbury by-pass and then read the material against it, before coming to a balanced personal decision?
Because of the realities of direct democracy, few nations use it. Some states in New England, USA, do use it at a local level but the number of people involved is manageable and the culture of the towns involved actively encourages participation. The issues discussed are relevant purely to the town and ,therefore, there is a good reason for involving yourself if you want your point of view heard. Meetings are held in town halls across New England - which, apart from cities such as Boston, is not highly populated. But how could the system work in heavily populated areas?
In the recent mayoral election in London, the small turnout of voters indicates that one aspect of direct democracy was not there - active participation by those who could have participated. Of those who did vote, how many will actively participate in the running of the city? Is the mechanism in place for people, other than those appointed by Ken Livingstone, to involve themselves in day-to-day decisions? This will be done by a cabinet selected by the mayor. The people of London will have no choice as to who sits on this city cabinet (just as the national electorate has no say in who sits on the government’s cabinet when it is picked). Is it physically possible to have a system that involves all those in London who wish to do so? How many Londoners understand the complexities of the issues which the city government will have to deal with? At this moment in time, London cannot be run by a system of direct democracy.
Technological developments in the future may change this. The expansion of the Internet and the speed with which communication can now be achieved, may favour direct democracy. The present government set-up a system in 1997, whereby 5,000 randomly selected members of the public (the so-called "People’s Panel") are asked about their reactions to government policy. However, there is no system in place which allows the public to help formulate government policy, and critics of the "People’s Panel" have called it a gimmick with no purpose.

Representative Democracy

Several off-shoots have grown out of representative democracy : participatory democracy and liberal democracy.
Britain is a representative democracy. This is where citizens within a country elect representatives to make decisions for them. Every 5 years in Britain, the people have the chance to vote into power those they wish to represent us in Parliament. These MP’s meet in the House of Commons to discuss matters and pass acts which then become British law. Within the House of Commons, each elected MP represents an area called a constituency. The voters in this constituency passed on the responsibility of participating in law making to this MP who, if successful within the Commons, could be re-elected by that constituency at the next general election. However, in stark comparison to direct democracy, the people hand over the responsibility of decision making to someone else who wishes to be in that position.
For five years, MP’s are responsible to their electorate. In this way they are held accountable to them. If they fail to perform (or if the party has done badly during its time in office) they can be removed by the people of their constituency. In this way, the people exercise control over their representatives.
However, by handing to their MP’s the right to participate in decision making within the Commons, the electorate is removing itself from the process of decision making. Though MP’s have constituency clinics where the people can voice an opinion on an issue, the electorate play no part in the mechanism of decision making - that process has been handed to MP’s and the government.
Within representative democracy, usually two types of MP’s emerge. There are those who believe that they should act and react to what the party and electorate wish - they believe that they have been elected to represent both; though an argument would be that the party wants the best for the electorate so the two are entirely compatible.
The other type of MP’s are the ones who believes that they should act in accordance to their conscience regardless of party and electorate stance. This gives such a MP the flexibility to ignore the wishes of both his party leadership and his constituency - therefore allowing himself to do as he/she sees fit. Is this democratic in any form? However, is it realistic for a MP to do what his/her constituency electorate wishes all the time? If he/she always follows the wishes of the majority within his/her constituency, what happens to those in the minority? Are they condemned to five years in which their views may be heard but are not acted on? Does a representative within the boundaries of "representative democracy", only represent the majority view and thus state that the wishes of a democratic society have been fulfilled? The "Tyranny of the Minority" is something that pure democracy is meant to prevent.
One way of expanding the participation of the electorate and therefore the whole ethos of democracy would be to initiate more mechanisms whereby the public can participate, should they wish, in the decision making process. Such mechanisms could be the greater use of public enquiries and referendums. Both would allow the public the ability to participate in the complete process of examining an issue, but they would not guarantee that the public would have any say in the final decision made by government.

Liberal Democracy

Britain, as well as being a representative democracy, has also been labelled a liberal democracy. Historically there are five main points behind liberal democracy :
the government should be limited in its impact on the person and the government should not enjoy arbitrary power. Elections must be free and fair. the government should do what it can to remove obstacles limiting the well being of people. This includes all groups with none excluded. the government’s involvement in the economic market of a country should be minimal. the government should be there to deal with problems when needed the right to vote should be extended to all (no longer applicable to Britain). A country that claims to be a "liberal democracy", embraces the whole issue of civil liberties. Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of assembly freedom of religion etc. (within the confines of the law) are of paramount importance. Within Britain these have been safe guarded by what is called the "rule of law". This guarantees someone equality before the law and it also ensures that the powers of those in government can be curtailed by laws that are enforceable in courts. This has been further developed by the growth of the impact of the European Court which can act as a ‘check and balance’ against the governments of member states.

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THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA: SOME OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA: SOME OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION

In the five years since the fall of President Suharto, Indonesia has had

three presidents—B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri—all of whom took power by democratic means. Most people have enjoyed freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of information, checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government, and a depoliticized military.

1However, if we ask Indonesians for their opinions on the current political situation in Indonesia, we receive mixed answers. A number of political analysts, such as Dr. Mochtar Pabottingi, a senior researcher at the Research Center for Political Studies in the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, says that the present Megawati administration is actually the second coming of Suharto’s New Order government (Orde Baru Jilid Dua). Another analyst, Jeffrey Winters, goes further, saying Megawati’s surname should not be Sukarnoputri (‘daughter of Sukarno’) but ‘Suhartoputri’, because her political behavior is similar to Suharto’s. Other analysts or observers characterize Indonesian politics as being marked by one step forward and two steps back.

Moderate political analysts are of the opinion that there has been some progress toward consolidated democracy but that Indonesians still face many challenges, both from within and outside the country. These include a lack of capacity among political elites, terrorism, problems at the political level, and a culture and society that is mostly still paternalistic, patrimonial and emotional. Last but not least, Indonesia still has problems with law enforcement, and there can be no democracy without the supremacy of the law.

What are the opinions of people on the streets? Their answers may surprise us. Many will say that they miss Suharto. During Suharto era, according to them, security was the top priority, their daily income was higher

1 Suharto’s government was described as the ‘New Order’ government to contrast it from the period of disorder under Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’.

than today and the price of daily necessities was quite low and certainly affordable for ordinary people. In the end, they wish Suharto was still in power or that a situation similar to the Suharto era, in which the military played the dominant role in Indonesian politics, was still in place. Most of the ordinary people in Indonesia were not aware that Suharto’s regime created a lot of problems for Indonesians, including human suffering, corruption, collusion, nepotism, economic dependency on foreign debt, and economic collapse. Apart from that, during the Suharto period, there was no political freedom at all.

Many NGO activists who have been active in empowering the economic capacity of village people beleive that poor village communities have been apathetic towards politics or have even been very antithetical towards political parties because politicians have never delivered on their promises. One NGO activist , states that:

2Democracy is a project of capitalism to secure free-market competition. Democracy does not solve the unjust economic exploitation of the poor by the economically rich. We do not need democracy, we need socialism. In essence, democracy is only needed by a small number of elites and political scientists in Jakarta, but not by the majority of the poor people.

We may come to the conclusion that during this transition period from the authoritarian regime of Suharto to consolidated democracy, many people have been disappointed with the current political, economic and security situation in the country. Many people felt that freeing Indonesia from the authoritarian regime would raise  standards of living. This is a challenge not only for the government, but also for pro-democracy supporters seeking to convince the electorate that a democratic system of government is better than an authoritarian regime. Indonesia still has a long way to go to become a mature democracy. Therefore, the country needs political endurance to answer the many challenges.

INDONESIA’S EXPERIENCE WITH THREE TYPES  OF DEMOCRACY

Indonesia has been struggling with democracy for decades. It has experience with three types of democracy, all of which failed. First was the failed attempt at parliamentary democracy (1949-1957) which led to the

2 Conference, ‘Transition Towards Democracy in Indonesia’, Hotel Santika, Jakarta, 18 October 2002.

3transition from parliamentary democracy to guided democracy (1957-1959), in which President Sukarno established the so called Zaken or Functional Cabinet, a business cabinet which consisted of members of political parties, economists and the military. Second, there was another attempt at ‘Guided Democracy’ under President Sukarno (1959-1965). The third and longest period was that of ‘Pancasila Democracy’ under President Suharto from March 1966 to May 1998.

Constitutional Democracy

 The period of Parliamentary democracy has various names. Herbert Feith

calls it ‘constitutional democracy’.4 Most in the Indonesian political community, writers and commentators call it ‘liberal democracy’, the term popularized by President Sukarno. However, ‘liberal democracy’ was used by Sukarno, more to mock Western democratic practices such as voting, which he criticized as ‘fifty percent plus one democracy’. 

5Feith defines six distinct features characteristic of constitutional democracy. First, civilians played a dominant role; second, parties were of great importance; third, the contenders for power showed respect for ‘rules of the game’ which were closely related to the existing constitution; fourth, most members of the political elites had some sort of commitment to symbols connected with constitutional democracy; fifth, civil liberties were rarely infringed; six, government used coercion sparingly.

It is still a subject of unending debate in Indonesia as to whether ‘liberal democracy’, ‘parliamentary democracy’ or ‘constitutional democracy’ really did fail in 1957. Many political scientists are of the opinion that liberal democracy did not fail; it was killed by Sukarno and the military. If there is a failure, then it is a logical consequence of a power game between the army and the president’s office vis-a-vis the social and political forces within the civil society. The dissolution of the Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) and the reinstitution of the 1945 Constitution have been taken as watershed events in the end of

3 See, for example, Daniel Dhakidae, ‘The Long and Winding Road: Constraints to Democracy in Indonesia’, in R. William Liddle, ed., Crafting Indonesian Democracy (Bandung: Mizan in Cooperation with PPW-LIPI and The Ford Foundation, 2001), pp.67-74. See also, M. Syafi’I Anwar, ed., Menggapai Kedaulatan Untuk Rakyat. 75 tahun Pro. Miriam Budiardjo (Bandung: Mizan in cooperation with Ummat, 1998), pp.132-158.

4 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973 [1962]).

Ibid.,
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constitutional democracy and the beginning of the next period in Indonesian political history, that of Guided Democracy.

From the idealist’s perspective, the failure of constitutional democracy was the result of a lack of sufficient institutional backup for democracy, namely a lack of education, a lack of democratic culture, and an insufficient economic base.

Guided Democracy

Demokrasi Terpimpin (guided democracy) concentrated power within the

executive, particularly the president. Guided democracy was a great contrast to liberal democracy. While liberal democracy put the emphasis on the process, guided democracy emphasized the attainment of one major objective; ‘a just and prosperous society’, only to be achieved by a ‘systematic and planned democracy’. President Sukarno loved to call it ‘democracy with leadership’.

Guided democracy was implemented in Indonesia from July 1959 to October 1965. After six years, however, the ‘systematic and planned democracy’ failed to achieve a healthy economic system. Indonesia’s economic situation was dire in 1965. Production had slowed dramatically. Exports and imports came to a halt and hyperinflation of more than 600 percent crippled the country. This economic collapse was followed by a struggle for power between the army and the Indonesian Communist Party. The murder of six army generals and one lieutenant by a left-wing elements in the Army76 capped the political and economic chaos and led to the Army coup d’etat on 11 March 1966 to bring down President Sukarno and his guided democracy.

Pancasila Democracy (1966-1998)

Pancasila democracy is a form of democracy guided by five principles of

national ideology (Pancasila). When General Suharto came to power he used the term Orde Baru or the ‘New Order’ and called Sukarno’s guided democracy Orde Lama, or the ‘Old Order’, the latter implying a rotten, bankrupt system. At first, the New Order seemed set to inaugurate a fresh new era when it freed

6 Sukarno referred to the movement on the early morning of 1 October 1965 as Gestok, an abbreviation of Gerakan Satu Oktober, while the Suharto regime called it Gestapu, similar to the Gestapo in Nazi Germany or G-30-S/PKI, an abbreviation for Gerakan 30 September (September 30 Movement), which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was accused of masterminding.

7 On 11 March 1966 President Sukarno was forced by the Army generals to sign a letter transferring power  to General Suharto. In Indonesia, Sukarno’s letter was known as ‘Super Semar’, an abbreviation of ‘Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret’ (Letter of Order of the 11 March). However, from a Javanese Shadow puppet (wayang) story, Semar is a royal servants known for a powerful spirit and strength.

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political detainees, and freed the press by lifting restrictions on newspapers, closed down by Sukarno. In other words, a process of liberalization was introduced by Suharto.

8As the years passed, however, the New Order moved slowly and surely in the direction of dictatorship. The Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian Nationalist Party could still make their voices heard and thus compete with the Army. The New Order, in reaction, drifted toward a full military regime to stifle such dissenting voices. The Army created the so-called Functional Group (Golongan Karya, or Golkar) as a political tool to gain legitimacy from the people through general elections.9 Suharto’s ties to the Army started to weaken when he asked B.J. Habibie to establish and chair the Association of Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, or ICMI) in 1991. During the early period of the 1990s, the rise of ICMI to power highlighted the division of the military into so-called ‘nationalists’ officers, nicknamed ‘red and white officers’ (after the colors of the national flag), as opposed to ‘green officers’, a color associated with Islam.

After that, the political interests of the ‘red and white’ Army became clearly different from those of Suharto.

During the New Order period, Suharto’s regime was outwardly a success. There was a long period of security and the maintenance of political and economic interests between Suharto and the Army. After the Indonesian economy collapsed in July 1997, national security and stability were upset by mass killings and riots in Jakarta in May 1998. At that point, military interests inexorably diverged from those of the Suharto family, leading to his down fall.

THE FOUR PHASES OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

This chapter argues that the demands for reformasi (reform) and democracy

were not only demands for a change of regime, but also for a change of political system. Such demands require an overhaul of all political, social and economic institutions and relations, and the establishment of a stable framework within which democratic practices can take root.

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan define the core criteria of democracy as:

Legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other

8 During the New Order period, Golkar  was not seen formally as a political party but as a functional group, a strategy aimed at discrediting political parties. 

9 Since Endriartono Sutarto, from the group of officers commissioned in 1971, became the Army Chief of Staff, he has successfully united the Army. 

basic freedoms of person; free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community, whatever their political preferences. Practically, this means the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political

office from direct or indirect electoral accountability.10

To establish how far any given country has gone towards a transition to democracy, Linz and Stepan argue that:

11A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.

12Theoretically, transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy is understood to take place within various phases. There are at least four phases that Indonesian politics have supposedly undergone, namely: pre-transition, liberalization, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. The final stage of democracy (maturation) is predicted to take place within a longer period.

The first phase (pre-transition) began during the period of Indonesia’s economic crises in 1997. Various anti-Orde Baru groups emerged to establish a reform movement as a political rival to the New Order regime. This period was marked by sporadic detentions and disappearances by the state apparatus against anti-New Order political activists. Meanwhile, the ongoing economic crises had worsened the image of the state. The credibility of the New Order as a strong and powerful regime crumbled everywhere, and this finally paved the way to mass movements and social unrest in several provinces. The shooting of four Trisakti University students on 12 May 1998 initiated strong

10 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, ‘Defining and Crafting Democratic Transition, Constitutions, and Consolidation’, in R. William Liddle, Crafting Indonesian Democracy (Bandung: Mizan in cooperation with PPW-LIPI and the Ford Foundation, 2001), p.18.

 Gerry van Klinken divided those transitions into four other steps, namely: decay of the authoritarian system, transition, consolidation, and finally maturation. See Gerry van Klinken, ‘How a democratic deal might be struck,’ in Arief Budiman , et al, Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute Monash University, 1999), p.59.

Ibid., p.19.
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13criticism against the New Order, domestically and internationally. The political turmoil led to three days of  social unrest in the days immediately following the shootings, in Jakarta and several other major cities in Indonesia. This was followed by student demonstrations in Jakarta and the occupation of parliament by students from 18 May 1998 until the fall of Suharto on 21 May 1998. Suharto transferred his presidency to B.J. Habibie.

14What the people and especially the students wanted was a new democratic constitution; one that was accountable and transparent. They also wanted reform of the justice system, freedom from ‘KKN’ (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) and for the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) to be kept out of politics. This ‘early stage of political transition’ from Suharto to Habibie was also an opening to the next stage of political liberalization from authoritarianism, and was marked by the withdrawal of five old political laws and the implementation of three new political laws. Habibie also embraced many democratic procedures, such as provisions for press freedom, free and fair elections, the decentralization of regional government and the release of political prisoners.

This period also was marked by its first genuinely democratic election since 1955. The 1999 election campaign had some similarities and differences with those of elections held during the New Order. The campaign itself took a similar form, such as public gatherings and festivals. The main differences, however, were in the wholesale re-politicization of society, the freedom of the media to report on the election, and the issues discussed. In the 1999 election, the media were free to report on the activities of all parties regularly, including live debates among party candidates. The issues debated were also different from those during the New Order period. The media, politicians, and the public were free to level any kind of criticism at the government. Among the popular issues was the need to stamp out ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’ and the promise to bring Suharto and his cronies to justice. However, apart from this, the candidates repeated themes similar to New Order campaigns, such as the improvement of wages for the laboring classes, the elimination of poverty, the struggle for justice, and a more equal distribution of wealth.

Although Habibie successfully portrayed political liberalization as the first step in the transition toward democracy, he failed to maintain his power

13 For a good historical background on this period, see, Geoff Forrester and R.J. May, eds., The Fall of Suharto (Bathurst, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998). 

14 Law No.2/1999 on Political Parties, Law No.3/1999 on General Elections and Law No.4/1999 on the Structure and Position of the MPR/DPR (Parliament).

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15because most Indonesian elites saw him as too close to the authoritarian Suharto regime. Apart from that, the political liberalization under his administration was not seen as a sincere personal political conviction, but rather as an expedient measure. It was believed that Habibie would never have allowed freedom of the press or the establishment of political parties without political pressure from the opposition, particularly university students. On the positive side during the Habibie period, there were no serious efforts to resume past human rights atrocities as practiced by the New Order regime.

16Larry Diamond labels this era of transition in Indonesia as falling into ‘a gray area’ of democracy ‘that is neither clearly democratic nor clearly undemocratic’. Although the 1999 general election was largely free and fair, Diamond noted some incidents of fraud and dubious conduct. 

The 1999 election was won by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) under Megawati Sukarnoputri, with Golkar (the perennial party in power under Suharto) as the runner-up. B.J. Habibie lost his chance to be re-elected President by the People’s Consultative Assembly (the MPR) because the assembly rejected his accountability speech, mostly related to East Timor Issues. And although PDIP was the electoral winner, the MPR elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth Indonesian president.

During the transition toward democracy in Indonesia, it is important to bear in mind that a compromise between authoritarian and democratic powers took place. The Abdurrahman Wahid government had to face one of the ‘paradoxes of democratic transition’, when New Order groups, both through parties such as the former ruling party, Golkar, and through powerful individuals, had to be accommodated because of their important political and economic roles. 

The next important stage should be the consolidation of democracy. In theory, in the consolidation phase, democratic values spread and take hold in society. In Indonesia, however, these values have not yet become embedded. Many of the political elites state that they are committed to supporting democracy and reform, but in reality they practise the kinds of politics that

15 See for example, Syamsuddin Haris, ‘Konflik Elite Sipil dan Dilema Konsolidasi Demokrasi Pasca Orde Baru’ (Conflict among civilian elites and the dilemma of democratic consolidation in the Post Suharto Era), in Maruto MD and Anwari WMK, eds., Reformasi Politik dan Kekuatan Masyarakat. Kendala dan Peluang Menuju Demokrasi (Political Reform and the Strength of the Society. Problems and Prospects toward Democracy) (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2002), pp.3-21.

16 Larry Diamond, ‘The Global State of Democracy’, Current History 99, no. 641 December 2000, p.414.

demonstrate their lack of political ethics—ethics that are essential for the development of democracy.

During the Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) government, political elites busied themselves with partisan struggles for power with little, if any, effort to advance the process of democratization. In a democratic system, the winning party in the election logically has the right to form the government. However, Indonesia’s system is, in some ways, disorderly, and may not reflect the will of the people. Megawati, who came ahead in the general election, was chosen only as Vice-President, and not President, causing much anger among her supporters. Meanwhile, the Poros Tengah (Axis Forces), acting as the coalition group of various Islamic political parties, succeeded in getting Gus Dur inaugurated as the fourth President. Furthermore, the system based on the 1945 Constitution does not make clear the relationship between Parliament and the President. Both have equal constitutional power and this has caused conflict between the two branches of government. 

The government that emerged from the 1999 election comprised a loose coalition of parties. The government was formed in October 1999 and initially consisted of figures from the leading parties, including PDI-P leaders, because of Megawati’s role as Vice-President. There were two concerns with such a coalition. The first was whether the government would be fragile because it was formed by an unsteady and ad hoc coalition, with Gus Dur himself coming from a minority grouping within this loose coalition.

Juan Linz describes what constitutes a consolidated democratic regime: 

17… when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. Additionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or is more or less isolated from prodemocratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and a-governmental forces alike become subject to, as well as habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions that are sanctioned by the new democratic process…

17 R. William Liddle, Crafting Indonesian Democracy (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), p.28.

Unfortunately, the Gus Dur administration failed to provide those preconditions. Political crises remained and were marked by clashes of interests between parties in the cabinet. His presidency found no mass support in the midst of ongoing violent conflicts in several regions; specifically, communal conflicts in Ambon, Maluku, and Poso and separatist movements in Aceh and Papua.

18This crisis of leadership was brought to a point of no return by the Bulog scandal, leading to opposition in the Parliament. Ultimately, Gus Dur was brought down by a coalition of forces including parties within his government and the TNI. A Special Assembly was held in July 2001 in the Parliament Building to impeach Gus Dur and this paved the way for Megawati to become the fifth President.

The new administration is now facing serious challenges to its own legitimacy, ranging from the lack of a domestic economic recovery, security problems,  and international criticism of its efforts to stamp out terrorism. The political situation is still fraught with problems since there has been no clear decision on constitutional amendments, not to mention inconsistencies in the political system. Constitutional crises could also become endemic since, on the one hand, Indonesia has a presidential system, but on the other, it also allows for impeachment. However, the fourth amendment to the 1945 Constitution, amended by the People’s Consultative Assembly in August 2002, now makes it difficult for the parliament to impeach the president.

19As has previously been described, Indonesia’s political system is in a ‘political gray zone’ under Megawati’s administration. Indonesia’s political transition has not moved forward but rather backward. There is no guarantee that the transition will move forward into a democracy per se. Indonesia’s democratic transition is marked by a situation in which democratic procedures take place, but substantial democracy is ignored.

20The October 2002 night-club bombing in Bali has also worsened the ‘democratic consolidation’, as the TNI has attempted to regain their previous domination of policy through a new Law on Terrorism, regarded by many as a new threat to democracy. The implementation of this will not only endanger the democratization process in Indonesia, but will strain relations between the

18 A scandal relating to the operations of the centralized state purchasing and distribution agency, the Bureau of Logistics (Bulog).

 Government Regulation (regarded as National Law) No.1/2002 and No.2/2002 on Terrorism (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang or Perpu).

Kompas, 20 July 2002.
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Megawati government and Islam as well. The government was accused of being a puppet of the United States in the global war on terrorism.

The United States, as part of its response to international terrorism, will also hamper the democratization process in Indonesia, because of US intentions to reintroduce a military-to-military relationship with Indonesia at the expense of democracy. Most observers in Jakarta believe that the present Bush administration is more focused on the war on terrorism than on democracy; a quite different policy from that of the previous administration. The US government’s intention to increase military and police cooperation with Indonesia must be balanced with a policy to support democratization in Indonesia. Indonesia is not America, where there is trust between the people and the security apparatus. In most cases, people are still traumatized by what was done by the security apparatus (ABRI, which included the armed forces and the police) during the New Order period. Fear of politicization of the military is still very real. On one hand there is a need to make the security apparatus become professional, on the other hand there is still public distrust towards the military (and even to the police). It is a dilemma for Indonesia, where democracy is still fragile. If the fight for democracy is lost, it means that terrorists, whoever they are, win.

21In today’s situation, pro-democracy movements are facing two kinds of danger. On one hand, there is a strong tendency for the old status quo elements to try to regain power through Golkar and the military forces. The latter is clearly the strongest among the support pillars of the Megawati regime. On the other hand, pro-democracy groups do not share any agreement on how to run the reformasi process. Many hoped that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intellectuals, and student movements would be able to influence political reform, but they also face internal weaknesses such as a lack of professional management skills to run their organizations, and a lack of networking and formulation of ideas. This situation leads to weak organizational accountability, and is taken advantage of by status quo groups.

The political elites, on the other hand, have already begun early political maneuvers for the elections scheduled for 2004. This has turned their attention from the real problems facing the nation. In other words, we are facing a leadership crisis, in which the leaders, both executive and legislative, are more concern with their future political positions than the people’s interests.

21 Mashudi Noorsalim, ‘Egoism a hindrance to progress in reform’ The Jakarta Post, 4 April 2002.

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CONCLUSION

One conclusion often mentioned by Indonesian intellectuals on

Indonesia’s political transition concerns its uncertainty. Divergent interests (none necessarily related to the needs of the country) of various the political adversaries have become more common. Reformasi as a driving force toward a democratic transition has remained empty jargon.

Apart from that, political developments in 2003 show that a number of political parties have tried to delegitimize Megawati’s administration since the government increased prices in three areas: fuel, electricity and telephone usage. They are not only making many political statements on those issues, but they also criticize the government’s policy of privatizing some public companies, particularly in the case of Indosat (Indonesian Telecommunication and Satellite). The government, based on intelligence analysis, has accused a number of political figures, namely retired Army general Wiranto, Fuad Bawazir (former minister during the Suharto era), Eros Djarot (a journalistturned—politician who used to be close to Megawati), Adi Sasono (former minister during the Habibie government) and Rizal Ramly (former economic minister during the Abdurrahman Wahid government), as being behind student, worker, and other demonstrations in early 2003. Most of the demonstrators not only demanded the cancellation of the price increases, but also that Megawati and Vice-President Hamzah Haz step down. 

It seems that most of political parties are more concerned with narrow party interests than the people’s or the nation’s interests. They have been busy with political maneuvering, either inside Parliament or outside, as part of their preparations for the 2004 general election. Both supporters and opponents of the Megawati administration are not fully aware that if civilian politicians fail to consolidate democracy in Indonesia, the gate will open for the military (particularly the Army) to take over the government. Present student and mass demonstrations show that the ‘parliament of the street’ is still alive as a consequence of the failure of political parties to aggregate and articulate people’s aspirations.

In conclusion, a lack of any democratic culture among students and political elites, and the tendency of the Army to see itself as ‘the guardian of the state’, threaten the transition to consolidated democracy in Indonesia. Whether or not democracy in Indonesia is stalled depends on whether political elites bear in mind what happened to the liberal democracy of the 1950s.

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